Since most news media nowadays are electronic in either their production, distribution, or delivery, and this blog is about engineering ethics, which relates to the right use of technology, including news media, I think the following personal reflection on a recent experience of mine falls within the greater ambit of what I'm trying to do here.
Recently I had been feeling more than the usual amount of hassle and anxiety. Ever since I began teaching, fall semesters have always been more stressful than spring semesters, and for various reasons this one has been worse than usual. Of late I had fallen into the habit of taking in the following news media daily, if not more often: National Public Radio news once or twice a day (at least half an hour total), the Austin American-Statesman newspaper, a well-known biweekly conservative magazine, and the magazine's daily set of blogs online as well which I read during lunch. The health-care debate was the nominal reason for such newshound behavior, but beyond a certain point the desire to hear or read news becomes its own justification—in other words, a habit.
Among the spiritual disciplines of both Christianity and other religions is the discipline of simplicity—of doing without things that are not necessarily harmful in themselves, but can distract us from more important matters if not placed under conscious control. Muslim believers around the world recently wrapped up the large-scale spiritual discipline called Ramadan, which involves a total dawn-to-dusk fast that runs for several weeks. The 19th-century author and preacher George MacDonald said something which I cannot find the exact quote for, but the sense was, "A man is diminished by anything outside himself which he thinks he cannot do without"—other than God, that is.
With these thoughts as background, I decided at the beginning of last week to go a whole week without listening to, watching, or reading any news media.
Of course I was immediately faced with the question of what constitutes "news media." I think my closest brush with breaking the fast happened in a doctor's office when I picked up a trade journal on radiology, and read about some recent advances in medical imaging technology. I suppose technically that was news media, but not the kind I was trying to avoid. For the most part, I succeeded in avoiding the thing I had sworn off from.
The point of any fast is not to see how many gold stars you can get by following the rules, but to practice the discipline of resisting one's desires, ordering them instead to a vision of the good. My vision of the good involves Christianity, but I recognize that other people follow other visions of the good as well.
So much for the reasons; what were the results?
Well, obviously I had more time to devote to other things, although frankly I didn't notice it that much. One consequence was that I hauled out an old portable CD player and instead of listening to NPR during a half-hour of exercise, I listened to the sound-track album of the Coen brothers film "O Brother Where Art Thou?" I don't know much about the art of sound recording (as opposed to the science), but that CD is one of the clearest and most fun-to-listen-to music recordings I have. The film itself was a rare combination of comedy, tragedy, and history (being based on Homer's Odyssey), and I found my ability simply to enjoy the music was greater than I have experienced for many months. I can liken it to what former smokers say about being able to smell flowers for the first time in years, soon after they quit smoking. I don't know how far we can take the analogy between cigarette smoke and news media, but there seems to be some subtle connection there.
I can't say my whole life turned into a tranquil drifting on calm seas. There were plenty of minor troubles (for instance, in a moment of haste I broke my wife's favorite coffee cup, a promotional item from Hewlett-Packard I received years ago with a liquid-crystal coffee thermometer on the side and Maxwell's Equations printed inside), but I perceived an overall lowering of an annoying kind of background tension or angst that had been bothering me for many months—really, ever since the health-care debate geared up in earnest last summer.
I have now stepped off the no-news-media wagon, deliberately, commencing with the Sunday paper yesterday. But I'm seriously considering making a news media fast a part of my routine. Much news these days is repetitive anyway, since it consists of recycling or tweaking the same things to fill the 24-hour cycles of a growing number of media outlets. So if you ignore the whole mess for a week, you're not likely to be seriously behind unless we have another 9/11 tragedy or something equally earthshaking during your fast.
One of my favorite authors, C. S. Lewis, was a professor of English at Oxford and Cambridge University, and famously ignored newspapers and radio most of his life. He used to say that if anything really important happened, someone would tell him about it sooner or later. It wasn't his job to keep up with the latest developments, and if your job does require you to do that, a media fast wouldn't be practical. But unless you'd be endangering your livelihood by doing so, I recommend trying it for a week or so. You may be surprised at the results.
Monday, October 26, 2009
Monday, October 19, 2009
The Deep Corruption of State-Sponsored Gambling
Long-time readers of this blog (both of you) know that I am no friend of gambling. One way to express my stand succinctly is to place myself on a spectrum of opinion ranging from the pro-gambling extreme of no legal or moral restrictions at all, to the anti-gambling extreme of total prohibition root and branch, all the way down to the private Saturday-night poker game among friends. On a scale where 0 is total-pro and 100 is total-anti, I'm about 85. I see no reason to interfere with small-scale gambling among friends and acquaintances, but when gambling becomes a large-scale business from which people earn their living, I start to get uncomfortable. Some new information I ran across recently has turned mild discomfort into acute dismay. But it is a dismay that few people share.
Like any habit, gambling can be addictive. Just as packs of cigarettes carry health-warning labels and booze ads caution users to "drink responsibly," many ads for lotteries and casinos feature 1-800 numbers to call in case you think your gambling is becoming a problem. What I didn't realize until I read Maura J. Casey's article in the November First Things magazine, is that many casinos make a huge fraction of their profits from a small number of gamblers who, by almost any definition, are addicted to the slots. And the slot machines are where an increasing amount of casino revenue comes from.
Casey cites a study by Harrah's, one of the big Las Vegas operations, that revealed the source of 90 percent of their profits: only 10 percent of their customers. Other studies from places as diverse as Nova Scotia and Australia confirm this pattern. So a very small number of people pour money into slots and other games literally as fast as they can push the buttons, and these people make the casinos profitable. And Casey shows how Harrah's has turned to scientific studies to optimize the design of slot machines so that people are not distracted by anything else and can play as often as ten to fifteen plays per minute. Clearly, someone in that state is not a fully rational individual, making the so-called informed choice that casinos claim as their justification for existence. "We're not forcing anyone to play," they say, but when you have a multi-million-dollar corporation with state-of-the-art monitoring and design teams on one side, and some poor cabdriver from Hoboken on his two-week vacation on the other side, most people would say it's not a fair contest.
Add to this the well-known fact that poorer populations spend proportionally much more of their income on gambling than wealthier folks do, and you have a classic case of exploitation. Not only do poor people spend more (one study cited in Scientific American showed that people who earn less than $12,400 a year spend an average of $645 a year-—over 5% of their gross income—on lotteries alone), but one neuroeconomist has found that simply feeling poor makes you more likely to gamble.
I am ashamed to admit that the Texas state lottery—a thing I thought the Baptists here would never allow—uses some of its revenues to support higher education, and indirectly pays my salary. I don't feel strongly enough about it to quit my job, though. That is one of those prudential judgments one has to make, like paying taxes despite the fact that the government spends some of your money on things you don't approve of. But this pattern of government sponsorship of gambling—either directly in the case of state lotteries, or indirectly in the case of state taxation of casinos—creates a deeply corrupt conflict of interest.
When poor, defenseless people are exploited by large, well-funded, well-organized corporations or institutions, there are only a couple of ways they can seek redress. They can organize themselves, but this is hard and poor people generally don't have a lot of free time to devote to organizing boycotts and going on protest marches. Or they can turn to the government for help. By any reasonable political philosophy, one important function of government is to defend people who cannot defend themselves against the depredations of powerful interests. But in the case of legalized gambling, the powerful interests either are supporting the government, or are the government. So this explains how hard it will be to turn back the corrupting tide of state-sponsored gambling that has seeped into nearly all states (Utah and Hawaii being the only exceptions by now), and that has insinuated itself into state budgets as what many view to be an essential revenue stream, especially in these fiscally constrained times. So there is almost a built-in barrier against doing anything through the legislative process to turn back the tide of legalized gambling.
I have a natural hope and a supernatural hope about this matter. The natural hope is that history's pendulum will eventually swing back. Lotteries were common in the early days of the republic—I believe Harvard's founding was partially funded through a lottery. But in the 1800s, public opinion turned against gambling, and if it has happened once, it could happen again. My supernatural hope is that God will act where governments refuse to help the exploited. I don't know when, where, or how, but that's up to God. As for the people responsible for the exploitation, well, the sooner they realize what they're doing and stop it, the better.
Sources: Maura J. Casey's article "Gambling with Lives" appears on pp. 37-41 of the November 2009 issue of First Things. The Scientific American piece on neuroeconomist George Loewenstein's study of how feelings of poverty affect gambling can be found at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=dangers-irrational-brain. And one of the many studies showing how poor people spend a larger percentage of their income on gambling than other groups can be found at http://www.buffalonews.com/426/story/789628.html.
Like any habit, gambling can be addictive. Just as packs of cigarettes carry health-warning labels and booze ads caution users to "drink responsibly," many ads for lotteries and casinos feature 1-800 numbers to call in case you think your gambling is becoming a problem. What I didn't realize until I read Maura J. Casey's article in the November First Things magazine, is that many casinos make a huge fraction of their profits from a small number of gamblers who, by almost any definition, are addicted to the slots. And the slot machines are where an increasing amount of casino revenue comes from.
Casey cites a study by Harrah's, one of the big Las Vegas operations, that revealed the source of 90 percent of their profits: only 10 percent of their customers. Other studies from places as diverse as Nova Scotia and Australia confirm this pattern. So a very small number of people pour money into slots and other games literally as fast as they can push the buttons, and these people make the casinos profitable. And Casey shows how Harrah's has turned to scientific studies to optimize the design of slot machines so that people are not distracted by anything else and can play as often as ten to fifteen plays per minute. Clearly, someone in that state is not a fully rational individual, making the so-called informed choice that casinos claim as their justification for existence. "We're not forcing anyone to play," they say, but when you have a multi-million-dollar corporation with state-of-the-art monitoring and design teams on one side, and some poor cabdriver from Hoboken on his two-week vacation on the other side, most people would say it's not a fair contest.
Add to this the well-known fact that poorer populations spend proportionally much more of their income on gambling than wealthier folks do, and you have a classic case of exploitation. Not only do poor people spend more (one study cited in Scientific American showed that people who earn less than $12,400 a year spend an average of $645 a year-—over 5% of their gross income—on lotteries alone), but one neuroeconomist has found that simply feeling poor makes you more likely to gamble.
I am ashamed to admit that the Texas state lottery—a thing I thought the Baptists here would never allow—uses some of its revenues to support higher education, and indirectly pays my salary. I don't feel strongly enough about it to quit my job, though. That is one of those prudential judgments one has to make, like paying taxes despite the fact that the government spends some of your money on things you don't approve of. But this pattern of government sponsorship of gambling—either directly in the case of state lotteries, or indirectly in the case of state taxation of casinos—creates a deeply corrupt conflict of interest.
When poor, defenseless people are exploited by large, well-funded, well-organized corporations or institutions, there are only a couple of ways they can seek redress. They can organize themselves, but this is hard and poor people generally don't have a lot of free time to devote to organizing boycotts and going on protest marches. Or they can turn to the government for help. By any reasonable political philosophy, one important function of government is to defend people who cannot defend themselves against the depredations of powerful interests. But in the case of legalized gambling, the powerful interests either are supporting the government, or are the government. So this explains how hard it will be to turn back the corrupting tide of state-sponsored gambling that has seeped into nearly all states (Utah and Hawaii being the only exceptions by now), and that has insinuated itself into state budgets as what many view to be an essential revenue stream, especially in these fiscally constrained times. So there is almost a built-in barrier against doing anything through the legislative process to turn back the tide of legalized gambling.
I have a natural hope and a supernatural hope about this matter. The natural hope is that history's pendulum will eventually swing back. Lotteries were common in the early days of the republic—I believe Harvard's founding was partially funded through a lottery. But in the 1800s, public opinion turned against gambling, and if it has happened once, it could happen again. My supernatural hope is that God will act where governments refuse to help the exploited. I don't know when, where, or how, but that's up to God. As for the people responsible for the exploitation, well, the sooner they realize what they're doing and stop it, the better.
Sources: Maura J. Casey's article "Gambling with Lives" appears on pp. 37-41 of the November 2009 issue of First Things. The Scientific American piece on neuroeconomist George Loewenstein's study of how feelings of poverty affect gambling can be found at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=dangers-irrational-brain. And one of the many studies showing how poor people spend a larger percentage of their income on gambling than other groups can be found at http://www.buffalonews.com/426/story/789628.html.
Monday, October 12, 2009
Washington Metro Deaths: The Accident that Wasn't Supposed to Happen
One of the things I like the most about visiting Washington, DC is its efficient, clean, and easy-to-use subway system. Whenever I need to visit Washington, I usually fly to the Baltimore-Washington Airport and then take public transportation from there. A car is a liability in Washington, as far as I'm concerned, because you can get to most places of importance on the subway. Washington's Metro is one of the newer of the nation's major public subways, having opened in 1976, and from the start it embodied computer-controlled systems of signaling and braking. So along with many other admirers of that system, I was shocked to read last June 23 of an accident the previous day that ultimately claimed the lives of a train operator and eight passengers. What went wrong?
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), in its slow, methodical way, is still investigating, but a compilation of news reports on Wikipedia can allow us to get a fairly good idea of what may have happened. The accident happened during the afternoon rush hour, just after 5 PM. As is often the case, Train No. 214 on the Red Line, one of the major north-south arteries, was stopped between the Takoma and Fort Totten stations, waiting for another train to clear the Fort Totten stop.
Trains have been waiting on tracks ever since there were trains and tracks, and in the pre-automation days a system of block signals was devised to warn oncoming traffic that the block of track ahead was occupied. When the engineer saw a yellow signal, he was to slow down, since it meant that there was another train in the block beyond the next one. Blocks were spaced far enough apart to allow plenty of room to stop the fastest train moving at a legal speed, and for the most part the system worked as long as engineers were paying attention and the signals were working.
While we will never know exactly what the oncoming train operator saw (she was killed in the accident), we do know from records that her train, No. 112, left the Takoma station at 4:57 PM. From what I understand, the Metro trains can operate in either an "enhanced" manual mode or a completely automatic mode. Operators can delay the train's departure to accommodate laggards who won't pull their arms out of the doors, for instance, but the system is also automatically supervised by braking sensors that presumably stop the train long before it could collide with another one. However, if the operators do their job, these emergency systems rarely come into play, and I can see how both operators and maintenance people might get lazy about making sure the automatic safety systems are in working order. According to reports, Train 112 was in automatic mode when the collision occurred.
At any rate, some time before 5:03 PM the operator of Train No. 112 applied the manual brake. This wasn't enough to keep her train from plowing into the rear of 214, telescoping onto the rear cars. "Telescoping" in a train collision means that one car rides up on top of another, usually doing great damage to both cars since the stationary car smashes much of the moving car's insides and vice-versa. Any people who happen to be in the way do not usually make it out unscathed. Although members of the U. S. Army who were present made heroic rescue efforts, they were not sufficient to prevent the nine fatalities and numerous injuries that resulted.
In tests on June 25, NTSB officials found that the track circuit located at the site of the stopped train failed to detect a test train placed on it. This is highly significant, since a similar failure would account for the accident. If the automatic systems didn't receive a signal that the No. 214 was stopped on the tracks, they would not have engaged and the only thing that would have averted the accident was a manual intervention by the operator. Why wouldn't the track circuit work?
The apparently simple task of figuring out whether a multi-ton railcar is present on a set of tracks is not as easy as it seems. Signaling currents have to be detected in an electrically noisy environment with large AC power currents running nearby to run the cars. The system has to work despite corrosion and oil on tracks, varying pressure on wheels, and a number of other factors. Down here in Texas, a new surface commuter rail system in Austin has been delayed repeatedly for many months partly because the train-detector track circuits have not yet worked properly. Perhaps a whole new concept of train detection is called for if the present systems are so flaky. But I'm not a railway engineer, of either the driving or designing kind, so I will refrain from second-guessing those whose job it is to fix such problems.
While we will have to wait to see what the NTSB ultimately concludes about this accident, it looks like it may well have been a fatal example of the old "garbage in, garbage out" saying. If the automated distributed braking systems don't have valid data to work with, they're not going to stop the train. And a harried, overworked (or perhaps inattentive) operator can't always be counted on to take action when she sees that a collision is imminent. Some of the Metro tunnels snake around and bend in ways that make it impossible to see far enough ahead at all points to avoid a collision, even if you paid all the attention in the world.
In the meantime, the next time I go to Washington, I'll still take the Metro. But I may make it a point to get into one of the middle cars.
Source: The Wikipedia article on this accident appears at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Washington_Metro_train_collision and was my primary source for this blog.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), in its slow, methodical way, is still investigating, but a compilation of news reports on Wikipedia can allow us to get a fairly good idea of what may have happened. The accident happened during the afternoon rush hour, just after 5 PM. As is often the case, Train No. 214 on the Red Line, one of the major north-south arteries, was stopped between the Takoma and Fort Totten stations, waiting for another train to clear the Fort Totten stop.
Trains have been waiting on tracks ever since there were trains and tracks, and in the pre-automation days a system of block signals was devised to warn oncoming traffic that the block of track ahead was occupied. When the engineer saw a yellow signal, he was to slow down, since it meant that there was another train in the block beyond the next one. Blocks were spaced far enough apart to allow plenty of room to stop the fastest train moving at a legal speed, and for the most part the system worked as long as engineers were paying attention and the signals were working.
While we will never know exactly what the oncoming train operator saw (she was killed in the accident), we do know from records that her train, No. 112, left the Takoma station at 4:57 PM. From what I understand, the Metro trains can operate in either an "enhanced" manual mode or a completely automatic mode. Operators can delay the train's departure to accommodate laggards who won't pull their arms out of the doors, for instance, but the system is also automatically supervised by braking sensors that presumably stop the train long before it could collide with another one. However, if the operators do their job, these emergency systems rarely come into play, and I can see how both operators and maintenance people might get lazy about making sure the automatic safety systems are in working order. According to reports, Train 112 was in automatic mode when the collision occurred.
At any rate, some time before 5:03 PM the operator of Train No. 112 applied the manual brake. This wasn't enough to keep her train from plowing into the rear of 214, telescoping onto the rear cars. "Telescoping" in a train collision means that one car rides up on top of another, usually doing great damage to both cars since the stationary car smashes much of the moving car's insides and vice-versa. Any people who happen to be in the way do not usually make it out unscathed. Although members of the U. S. Army who were present made heroic rescue efforts, they were not sufficient to prevent the nine fatalities and numerous injuries that resulted.
In tests on June 25, NTSB officials found that the track circuit located at the site of the stopped train failed to detect a test train placed on it. This is highly significant, since a similar failure would account for the accident. If the automatic systems didn't receive a signal that the No. 214 was stopped on the tracks, they would not have engaged and the only thing that would have averted the accident was a manual intervention by the operator. Why wouldn't the track circuit work?
The apparently simple task of figuring out whether a multi-ton railcar is present on a set of tracks is not as easy as it seems. Signaling currents have to be detected in an electrically noisy environment with large AC power currents running nearby to run the cars. The system has to work despite corrosion and oil on tracks, varying pressure on wheels, and a number of other factors. Down here in Texas, a new surface commuter rail system in Austin has been delayed repeatedly for many months partly because the train-detector track circuits have not yet worked properly. Perhaps a whole new concept of train detection is called for if the present systems are so flaky. But I'm not a railway engineer, of either the driving or designing kind, so I will refrain from second-guessing those whose job it is to fix such problems.
While we will have to wait to see what the NTSB ultimately concludes about this accident, it looks like it may well have been a fatal example of the old "garbage in, garbage out" saying. If the automated distributed braking systems don't have valid data to work with, they're not going to stop the train. And a harried, overworked (or perhaps inattentive) operator can't always be counted on to take action when she sees that a collision is imminent. Some of the Metro tunnels snake around and bend in ways that make it impossible to see far enough ahead at all points to avoid a collision, even if you paid all the attention in the world.
In the meantime, the next time I go to Washington, I'll still take the Metro. But I may make it a point to get into one of the middle cars.
Source: The Wikipedia article on this accident appears at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Washington_Metro_train_collision and was my primary source for this blog.
Monday, October 05, 2009
Microethics, Macroethics, and the Working Engineer
Normally, we don't deal much with ethical theory in this blog, but every so often it's worthwhile to look at the underpinnings of why we think about engineering ethics, and ways to think about it. A distinction that you may find helpful in sorting through engineering ethics questions is the difference between so-called "microethics" and "macroethics."
You may have encountered the micro-macro distinction first in an introductory economics course. Microethics, you were told, deals with the individual decisions of householders or business owners with regard to pricing, buying, and selling things and services. Macroethics, on the other hand, deals in the large-scale economies of industries, nations, or the globe as a whole. While it would be nice if microeconomists could ignore macroeconomics and vice-versa, I recently read an article saying that if everyone in the recent economic downturn had acted in a way that was sensible and rational on an individual basis, we would pretty much be in the mess we're in already. That is, sensible and even ethical individual decisions can sometimes lead to large-scale disasters nonetheless.
The same can happen in engineering, which is why Joseph R. Herkert, among others, has been writing about the microethics-macroethics distinction for close to a decade now. Joe (as I know him) is Lincoln Associate Professor of Ethics and Technology at the School of Applied Arts and Sciences, Arizona State University. He points out that for most of the history of engineering ethics, the decisions of individual engineers were taken to be the meat and potatoes of the subject. While this was good in the sense that no one had studied the matter as a formal academic topic before, the approach tended to brush aside larger issues affecting entire industries or countries.
For example, in the days before extensive environmental regulations were passed in the 1970s, it was still possible for companies to install expensive antipollution equipment (assuming it was available), and to be good environmental citizens. But if an individual engineer at a highly polluting chemical plant in, say, 1955, made a unilateral decision to spend millions of dollars reducing pollution, it would have affected the firm's bottom line adversely. In an industry where no one else was spending such amounts, the engineer's company would have been put at a disadvantage, and might even have gone out of business, even if the engineer didn't get fired first for making what would have been viewed as a money-wasting decision. So while we today might view that engineer as a farsighted pioneer whose actions were a good example for others to follow in later decades, in the context of the 1950s such a decision would have run afoul of a macroethical regulatory and economic environment that was dead-set opposed to the idea.
Macroethics in engineering simply takes into account the fact that even if everyone makes good microethical decisions, you can have systems and legal frameworks and large-scale institutions in place which nevertheless cause harm, and need to be addressed from an ethical point of view. Since macroethics matters cannot generally be changed at will by an individual engineer, you may wonder why we should even bother to think about them. After all, what can one engineer do to change an entire industry or nation?
More than you think. There are politically active engineers, but not that many. In a democracy, voting is one way an individual can influence policies at the macroethics level. Also, by explaining technical matters to the public and educating the general population about the technical realities and limitations of a macroethical matter, engineers can perform a great and much-needed service. Most people have no idea how any of the technical marvels they use every day are brought into being, and so they have even less of an idea that there are limits of any kind. There is a persistent rumor that the major automotive companies have had a long-range electric car hidden in their back rooms for decades, but suppress it because it would threaten their current business. Anyone who knows a little technically about how battery-powered cars work and the current state of the art of battery technology can figure out why this isn't the case (unless the companies have done a very good job of hiding some unimaginable physics and engineering!). While engineers have to be careful in public speaking, not talking down to or insulting their listeners, a careful, clear explanation of basic technology can go far to alleviate what an engineer might think of as irrational fears or beliefs.
But one lesson it took me a long time to learn is that even irrational beliefs influence behavior. The U. S. nuclear-power industry once led the world in the development of advanced nuclear reactors for generating electricity on a large scale. But a series of public-relations disasters and one real disaster that was largely harmless to human life (Three Mile Island) turned the U. S. public against nuclear power. Instead of acknowledging this attitude and trying to deal with it, advocates of nuclear energy largely dismissed it as "irrational," and the industry is now trying to undo thirty years of neglect and wandering in the wilderness.
Even individual engineers need to think about macroethical issues from time to time, even if you don't deal with them on a day-to-day basis. By taking an engineering job, you implicitly endorse the firm, the industry, and the nation that claims you. So in that sense at least, macroethics matters to every individual engineer.
Sources: The first article on microethics and macroethics applied to engineering appears to be J. R. Herkert, "Future Directions in Engineering Ethics Research: Microethics, Macroethics and the Role of Professional Societies," Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 7, pp. 403-414 (2001).
You may have encountered the micro-macro distinction first in an introductory economics course. Microethics, you were told, deals with the individual decisions of householders or business owners with regard to pricing, buying, and selling things and services. Macroethics, on the other hand, deals in the large-scale economies of industries, nations, or the globe as a whole. While it would be nice if microeconomists could ignore macroeconomics and vice-versa, I recently read an article saying that if everyone in the recent economic downturn had acted in a way that was sensible and rational on an individual basis, we would pretty much be in the mess we're in already. That is, sensible and even ethical individual decisions can sometimes lead to large-scale disasters nonetheless.
The same can happen in engineering, which is why Joseph R. Herkert, among others, has been writing about the microethics-macroethics distinction for close to a decade now. Joe (as I know him) is Lincoln Associate Professor of Ethics and Technology at the School of Applied Arts and Sciences, Arizona State University. He points out that for most of the history of engineering ethics, the decisions of individual engineers were taken to be the meat and potatoes of the subject. While this was good in the sense that no one had studied the matter as a formal academic topic before, the approach tended to brush aside larger issues affecting entire industries or countries.
For example, in the days before extensive environmental regulations were passed in the 1970s, it was still possible for companies to install expensive antipollution equipment (assuming it was available), and to be good environmental citizens. But if an individual engineer at a highly polluting chemical plant in, say, 1955, made a unilateral decision to spend millions of dollars reducing pollution, it would have affected the firm's bottom line adversely. In an industry where no one else was spending such amounts, the engineer's company would have been put at a disadvantage, and might even have gone out of business, even if the engineer didn't get fired first for making what would have been viewed as a money-wasting decision. So while we today might view that engineer as a farsighted pioneer whose actions were a good example for others to follow in later decades, in the context of the 1950s such a decision would have run afoul of a macroethical regulatory and economic environment that was dead-set opposed to the idea.
Macroethics in engineering simply takes into account the fact that even if everyone makes good microethical decisions, you can have systems and legal frameworks and large-scale institutions in place which nevertheless cause harm, and need to be addressed from an ethical point of view. Since macroethics matters cannot generally be changed at will by an individual engineer, you may wonder why we should even bother to think about them. After all, what can one engineer do to change an entire industry or nation?
More than you think. There are politically active engineers, but not that many. In a democracy, voting is one way an individual can influence policies at the macroethics level. Also, by explaining technical matters to the public and educating the general population about the technical realities and limitations of a macroethical matter, engineers can perform a great and much-needed service. Most people have no idea how any of the technical marvels they use every day are brought into being, and so they have even less of an idea that there are limits of any kind. There is a persistent rumor that the major automotive companies have had a long-range electric car hidden in their back rooms for decades, but suppress it because it would threaten their current business. Anyone who knows a little technically about how battery-powered cars work and the current state of the art of battery technology can figure out why this isn't the case (unless the companies have done a very good job of hiding some unimaginable physics and engineering!). While engineers have to be careful in public speaking, not talking down to or insulting their listeners, a careful, clear explanation of basic technology can go far to alleviate what an engineer might think of as irrational fears or beliefs.
But one lesson it took me a long time to learn is that even irrational beliefs influence behavior. The U. S. nuclear-power industry once led the world in the development of advanced nuclear reactors for generating electricity on a large scale. But a series of public-relations disasters and one real disaster that was largely harmless to human life (Three Mile Island) turned the U. S. public against nuclear power. Instead of acknowledging this attitude and trying to deal with it, advocates of nuclear energy largely dismissed it as "irrational," and the industry is now trying to undo thirty years of neglect and wandering in the wilderness.
Even individual engineers need to think about macroethical issues from time to time, even if you don't deal with them on a day-to-day basis. By taking an engineering job, you implicitly endorse the firm, the industry, and the nation that claims you. So in that sense at least, macroethics matters to every individual engineer.
Sources: The first article on microethics and macroethics applied to engineering appears to be J. R. Herkert, "Future Directions in Engineering Ethics Research: Microethics, Macroethics and the Role of Professional Societies," Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 7, pp. 403-414 (2001).
Monday, September 28, 2009
Net Neutrality: Wireless Too?
A week ago today, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski started a kerfuffle when he called for net neutrality in wireless as well as wired Internet services. To understand why this has upset a number of Internet service providers, and why they're upset, we need to review a few terms.
"Net neutrality" is the idea that service providers shouldn't discriminate among different uses of the Internet. That is, if I sign up for Internet service with Company A, I should be able to use the Internet to look up recipes for Hungarian goulash, or use voice-over-internet to call my aunt in Poughkeepsie, or legally download "Up" (whenever that becomes possible), and Company A should let me do any or all of these things. Why should Company A care, and especially, why should they care if I'm using an iPhone or other wireless device connected directly to their wireless network?
The short answer is, bandwidth. Bandwidth is to the Internet as pipes are to a water-supply system. You want more water, you need more and bigger pipes, and the same goes for the Internet. And there's a big difference in bandwidth between so-called "wired" service (really it should be called "fibered" since fiber cables carry most of the traffic), and wireless service that goes directly from the user's device to a service provider's cellphone tower or other wireless hub. (If you are using your own little wireless network around your home, as I do, that counts as wired service since it goes to a cable once it leaves your house.)
The bandwidth of wired services is limited only by what physical cables can be put in place between you and the main Internet. In most parts of the country served this way, there is plenty of bandwidth around on cable TV systems (most of which are mostly using fiber-optics anyway for a good part of their links) and especially if you are at a company or institution that has direct fiber connections. So although you may pay more to get a lot of bandwidth, it's out there and there's no particular reason your service provider should be chintzy and keep you from using bandwidth-hog services such as downloading peer-to-peer movies.
But if you try stunts like that on your iPhone, the service providers have a least a technical case in their favor. Unlike wired services, wireless services use limited slices of the airwaves, including some which the government recently auctioned off as a result of the switch to digital TV. The service providers paid billions for these wavelengths, because it was a little like when the Dutch paid the Indians for Manhattan. They aren't making any more Manhattans, so when it came up for sale they were wise to buy, at least from a real-estate perspective. (I won't get into treatment of indigenous peoples here—one ethical problem at a time!) There's only so much spectrum bandwidth out there, and when it fills up, the only way you can squeeze more data through it is to get more clever technology, and even that has a limit called Shannon's information theorem.
So when AT&T and company read about Chairman Genachowski's call for net neutrality even in wireless services, they set up a howl. Genachowski, an Obama appointee who worked closely with the candidate on telecommunications issues, is a Harvard-trained lawyer with experience clerking for Supreme Court justices and working for internet firms. Given his rather rarefied background, he has had at least an opportunity to see what private enterprise is like. But like most government agencies in the executive branch, the FCC is a pseudo-democracy. When they propose rules they allow time for comments and so on, but there is no law requiring the Commission to take comments into account in their rulemaking. So when Genachowski talks, companies listen.
In his speech, which actually does a good job of portraying the current situation in historical perspective, Genachowski cited the long tradition of openness and transparency of the Internet, right down to its technical structure that pushes applications to the edges and makes the main system act pretty much like a "dumb pipe." This is an example of how technical structure can influence behavior. For instance, if there were an easy way to monitor and bill Internet users for each particular use of the Internet over a certain provider, the way the old POTS (plain old telephone service) used to work, things would be vastly different, and arguably not near as far along as they are today. Placing approximately zero marginal cost on transactions encourages greater and more innovative use of a resource than if you knew you were going to be out a quarter for every time you queried Google, for instance. If that were true, I'd be broke a long time ago.
On the other hand, excessive government enforcement of egalitarian principles can lead to problems as well. Take the Cuban health system, for instance. Yes, it's free for all Cuban citizens, but outside of a few friends of documentary filmmaker Michael Moore who took their illnesses to Havana after they ran into problems in the U. S., I'm not aware of too many medical tourists who are drawn to the Cuban health-care system like flies to honey. The present fuss over wireless net neutrality is more likely a pro-forma complaint about something that the service providers were already figuring out how to do. And Genachowski himself allowed as to how in exceptional cases (periods of high demand, etc.) providers might have to restrict access to some services simply to maintain the stability and integrity of their networks. So they have an escape clause, so to speak.
The FCC is going to go ahead and do what it likes, and as in the past, the service providers will find a way to deal with it. Sometimes government regulation can even encourage innovation, as Genachowski appears to hope will be the case here. I hope and trust he's right.
Sources: I used material from an online editorial by Lynette Luna at the website FierceMobileIT, http://www.fiercemobileit.com/story/could-wireless-net-neutrality-be-boon-enterprise/2009-09-23. Chairman Genachowski's speech can be read in its entirety at http://www.openinternet.gov/read-speech.html.
"Net neutrality" is the idea that service providers shouldn't discriminate among different uses of the Internet. That is, if I sign up for Internet service with Company A, I should be able to use the Internet to look up recipes for Hungarian goulash, or use voice-over-internet to call my aunt in Poughkeepsie, or legally download "Up" (whenever that becomes possible), and Company A should let me do any or all of these things. Why should Company A care, and especially, why should they care if I'm using an iPhone or other wireless device connected directly to their wireless network?
The short answer is, bandwidth. Bandwidth is to the Internet as pipes are to a water-supply system. You want more water, you need more and bigger pipes, and the same goes for the Internet. And there's a big difference in bandwidth between so-called "wired" service (really it should be called "fibered" since fiber cables carry most of the traffic), and wireless service that goes directly from the user's device to a service provider's cellphone tower or other wireless hub. (If you are using your own little wireless network around your home, as I do, that counts as wired service since it goes to a cable once it leaves your house.)
The bandwidth of wired services is limited only by what physical cables can be put in place between you and the main Internet. In most parts of the country served this way, there is plenty of bandwidth around on cable TV systems (most of which are mostly using fiber-optics anyway for a good part of their links) and especially if you are at a company or institution that has direct fiber connections. So although you may pay more to get a lot of bandwidth, it's out there and there's no particular reason your service provider should be chintzy and keep you from using bandwidth-hog services such as downloading peer-to-peer movies.
But if you try stunts like that on your iPhone, the service providers have a least a technical case in their favor. Unlike wired services, wireless services use limited slices of the airwaves, including some which the government recently auctioned off as a result of the switch to digital TV. The service providers paid billions for these wavelengths, because it was a little like when the Dutch paid the Indians for Manhattan. They aren't making any more Manhattans, so when it came up for sale they were wise to buy, at least from a real-estate perspective. (I won't get into treatment of indigenous peoples here—one ethical problem at a time!) There's only so much spectrum bandwidth out there, and when it fills up, the only way you can squeeze more data through it is to get more clever technology, and even that has a limit called Shannon's information theorem.
So when AT&T and company read about Chairman Genachowski's call for net neutrality even in wireless services, they set up a howl. Genachowski, an Obama appointee who worked closely with the candidate on telecommunications issues, is a Harvard-trained lawyer with experience clerking for Supreme Court justices and working for internet firms. Given his rather rarefied background, he has had at least an opportunity to see what private enterprise is like. But like most government agencies in the executive branch, the FCC is a pseudo-democracy. When they propose rules they allow time for comments and so on, but there is no law requiring the Commission to take comments into account in their rulemaking. So when Genachowski talks, companies listen.
In his speech, which actually does a good job of portraying the current situation in historical perspective, Genachowski cited the long tradition of openness and transparency of the Internet, right down to its technical structure that pushes applications to the edges and makes the main system act pretty much like a "dumb pipe." This is an example of how technical structure can influence behavior. For instance, if there were an easy way to monitor and bill Internet users for each particular use of the Internet over a certain provider, the way the old POTS (plain old telephone service) used to work, things would be vastly different, and arguably not near as far along as they are today. Placing approximately zero marginal cost on transactions encourages greater and more innovative use of a resource than if you knew you were going to be out a quarter for every time you queried Google, for instance. If that were true, I'd be broke a long time ago.
On the other hand, excessive government enforcement of egalitarian principles can lead to problems as well. Take the Cuban health system, for instance. Yes, it's free for all Cuban citizens, but outside of a few friends of documentary filmmaker Michael Moore who took their illnesses to Havana after they ran into problems in the U. S., I'm not aware of too many medical tourists who are drawn to the Cuban health-care system like flies to honey. The present fuss over wireless net neutrality is more likely a pro-forma complaint about something that the service providers were already figuring out how to do. And Genachowski himself allowed as to how in exceptional cases (periods of high demand, etc.) providers might have to restrict access to some services simply to maintain the stability and integrity of their networks. So they have an escape clause, so to speak.
The FCC is going to go ahead and do what it likes, and as in the past, the service providers will find a way to deal with it. Sometimes government regulation can even encourage innovation, as Genachowski appears to hope will be the case here. I hope and trust he's right.
Sources: I used material from an online editorial by Lynette Luna at the website FierceMobileIT, http://www.fiercemobileit.com/story/could-wireless-net-neutrality-be-boon-enterprise/2009-09-23. Chairman Genachowski's speech can be read in its entirety at http://www.openinternet.gov/read-speech.html.
Monday, September 21, 2009
The Internet's Threat to Civilization and Two Kinds of Ham
Among the moral and social implications of technology we have considered in this space over the years, the Internet looms large. You wouldn't be reading this blog without it, yet there are studies and articles out there that show how students are losing the ability to read sequentially, follow arguments, and write more than a sentence or two without the uncontrollable urge to use an emoticon.
At times I'm sympathetic with this trend of thought. After years of looking up material on search engines, I've caught myself reading ordinary text in the Internet way—hastily skimming through paragraphs of carefully assembled prose like a motorcycle gang blasting through Central Park. When I realize what I'm doing, I try to slow down, but the habit is still there. And some of the uncomfortable side effects of mass digitizing of information are disquieting. For example, libraries around the world are looking at their now-digitized piles of paper and microfilm and asking, "Why should we keep paying for all this expensive space to store something that we already have on a few dozen mainframe hard drives in one room?" And we won't even mention what's happening to newspapers.
But sometimes it takes a person with a longer perspective to show you that things are not as bad as they seem. Dennis Baron, a professor of linguistics at University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, has written a book showing that the same mixture of hope, fear, and nostalgia has accompanied the advent of every novel communications technology, all the way back to the invention of writing itself. I have read only an interview with the author, not the book itself, but Baron views the current anxieties over an Internet-overdosed society to be overblown. He thinks at least as much good as harm comes from the social-networking activities on Facebook and so on, and points out that students themselves—at least the better ones—treat overuse of emoticons as a phase to be grown out of as they learn how the adult world expects them to communicate.
A similar view comes from my experiences, now largely historical, in the rarefied world of amateur radio. Ever since the birth of radio itself, there has been a small cadre of individuals who have used the medium, not for commercial purposes (in fact the laws pertaining to amateur radio forbid it), but for the fun of it. So most countries have set aside bits of the radio spectrum for these hobbyists, known as radio amateurs or "hams."
I joined the ranks of hamdom while still in college, and for a number of years was quite active with a roomful of largely surplus radio gear and antennas sprouting from the roof of our house. As time went on, I came to realize that all hamdom is divided into two kinds of ham.
The first kind, of which I was one, delights in the technology itself. These folks are constantly building new rigs or buying the latest gear to try out new features. The presence of a live person on the other end of the communications link is merely a convenience to them, to prove that the system itself works over the distance required. To somewhat misapply Marshall McLuhan, the medium becomes the message—the way a thing is communicated overwhelms the content of the communication. This attitude does nothing to further human community, in the long run.
The second kind views ham radio as simply a means of communicating with other people. Their delight is not in the technology, which they often learn rather grudgingly, but in the ever-new surprise of who might be sitting at the microphone, key, or keyboard at the other side of the ionospheric link. Think of an ongoing party with members from every part of the world, and that's what attracts the second kind of ham. I understand that the late Marlon Brando was an enthusiastic ham radio operator at various times in his life, and I suspect he was this type of ham. Although I have no surveys to back me up, I suspect that this type of operator tends to stay with the hobby longer, since the novelty of getting to know new people is truly inexhaustible.
The microcosm of ham radio prefigured the macrocosm of the Internet in many ways. Both are basically global means of communication; both impose certain restrictions on the style of communication, the length, and how the other party can be accessed; and both require at least a minimum knowledge of technology. On the Internet, the vast majority of users couldn't care less about the technology unless it gets in their way. Most users are interested in the content, not the method. The few hackers and geeks who play with the Internet simply because it's technologically neat are welcome to their amusements, but I haven't run across any lately. Of course there are those who use it for nefarious purposes, but you will always have a few bad apples in every crop.
As time went on my interest in ham radio waned. I still have my rig sitting on my desk here in the study, but it's been years since I fired it up. In the meantime, the Internet has become as much a part of my life as using electricity, as it has for billions of others around the globe. I will not commit the error of saying the Internet is neutral and it's how you use it that makes it good or bad. Like any other technology that humans use, it tends to incline our actions in certain directions, and these directions are almost never exactly neutral. But on the whole, the Internet has allowed more people to communicate at less cost, and that tends to benefit society, whatever bad habits they pick up along the way.
Sources: An interview with Dennis Baron appears in the online edition of Salon.com at http://www.salon.com/books/int/2009/09/19/better_pencil/. His book, A Better Pencil, has just been published by Oxford University Press, which still believes in paper, for the time being anyway. And for those hams who are curious, my call letters are KD5DC.
At times I'm sympathetic with this trend of thought. After years of looking up material on search engines, I've caught myself reading ordinary text in the Internet way—hastily skimming through paragraphs of carefully assembled prose like a motorcycle gang blasting through Central Park. When I realize what I'm doing, I try to slow down, but the habit is still there. And some of the uncomfortable side effects of mass digitizing of information are disquieting. For example, libraries around the world are looking at their now-digitized piles of paper and microfilm and asking, "Why should we keep paying for all this expensive space to store something that we already have on a few dozen mainframe hard drives in one room?" And we won't even mention what's happening to newspapers.
But sometimes it takes a person with a longer perspective to show you that things are not as bad as they seem. Dennis Baron, a professor of linguistics at University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, has written a book showing that the same mixture of hope, fear, and nostalgia has accompanied the advent of every novel communications technology, all the way back to the invention of writing itself. I have read only an interview with the author, not the book itself, but Baron views the current anxieties over an Internet-overdosed society to be overblown. He thinks at least as much good as harm comes from the social-networking activities on Facebook and so on, and points out that students themselves—at least the better ones—treat overuse of emoticons as a phase to be grown out of as they learn how the adult world expects them to communicate.
A similar view comes from my experiences, now largely historical, in the rarefied world of amateur radio. Ever since the birth of radio itself, there has been a small cadre of individuals who have used the medium, not for commercial purposes (in fact the laws pertaining to amateur radio forbid it), but for the fun of it. So most countries have set aside bits of the radio spectrum for these hobbyists, known as radio amateurs or "hams."
I joined the ranks of hamdom while still in college, and for a number of years was quite active with a roomful of largely surplus radio gear and antennas sprouting from the roof of our house. As time went on, I came to realize that all hamdom is divided into two kinds of ham.
The first kind, of which I was one, delights in the technology itself. These folks are constantly building new rigs or buying the latest gear to try out new features. The presence of a live person on the other end of the communications link is merely a convenience to them, to prove that the system itself works over the distance required. To somewhat misapply Marshall McLuhan, the medium becomes the message—the way a thing is communicated overwhelms the content of the communication. This attitude does nothing to further human community, in the long run.
The second kind views ham radio as simply a means of communicating with other people. Their delight is not in the technology, which they often learn rather grudgingly, but in the ever-new surprise of who might be sitting at the microphone, key, or keyboard at the other side of the ionospheric link. Think of an ongoing party with members from every part of the world, and that's what attracts the second kind of ham. I understand that the late Marlon Brando was an enthusiastic ham radio operator at various times in his life, and I suspect he was this type of ham. Although I have no surveys to back me up, I suspect that this type of operator tends to stay with the hobby longer, since the novelty of getting to know new people is truly inexhaustible.
The microcosm of ham radio prefigured the macrocosm of the Internet in many ways. Both are basically global means of communication; both impose certain restrictions on the style of communication, the length, and how the other party can be accessed; and both require at least a minimum knowledge of technology. On the Internet, the vast majority of users couldn't care less about the technology unless it gets in their way. Most users are interested in the content, not the method. The few hackers and geeks who play with the Internet simply because it's technologically neat are welcome to their amusements, but I haven't run across any lately. Of course there are those who use it for nefarious purposes, but you will always have a few bad apples in every crop.
As time went on my interest in ham radio waned. I still have my rig sitting on my desk here in the study, but it's been years since I fired it up. In the meantime, the Internet has become as much a part of my life as using electricity, as it has for billions of others around the globe. I will not commit the error of saying the Internet is neutral and it's how you use it that makes it good or bad. Like any other technology that humans use, it tends to incline our actions in certain directions, and these directions are almost never exactly neutral. But on the whole, the Internet has allowed more people to communicate at less cost, and that tends to benefit society, whatever bad habits they pick up along the way.
Sources: An interview with Dennis Baron appears in the online edition of Salon.com at http://www.salon.com/books/int/2009/09/19/better_pencil/. His book, A Better Pencil, has just been published by Oxford University Press, which still believes in paper, for the time being anyway. And for those hams who are curious, my call letters are KD5DC.
Sunday, September 13, 2009
Albert Gonzales: Two-Faced Hacker
An adage says there is no honor among thieves. U. S. Secret Service agents who employed a self-taught 28-year-old computer genius named Albert Gonzales to inform them of the activities of other hackers may now wish they'd never heard of him. Not only was Gonzales tipping off hackers that they were targets of federal investigations, Gonzales went on to break all records, not once but twice, for the largest amount of stolen credit-card and debit-card data: some 130 million numbers he amassed with the help of unnamed foreign cohorts, many in the former Soviet Union countries. Placed under arrest in 2008, Gonzales at first pled innocent, but as charges mounted up, first in New York, then in Massachusetts and New Jersey, and as he finally faced federal charges, on August 28 he decided to plead guilty. He will be behind bars at least until middle age, by which time his hacking skills will be hopelessly out of date. But will there still be hackers in 2034? My guess is: almost certainly.
I could dwell on the details of Gonzales's high lifestyle in his native town of Miami, but it is like the high-living stories of most other thieves: spend it while you got it, because you don't know when you'll ever have it again. You wonder if the Secret Service folks paying him for information ever noticed the BMW and the Rolex, but maybe he'd quit dealing with them by the time he was rolling in dough from more profitable employment.
This raises an ethical question that everyone who deals with computer security has to face: when does trying to think like a hacker in order to outwit other hackers cross the line into the gray area when you become a hacker yourself?
The term "hacker" means different things in different contexts. Back in the Middle Ages of electronics, I used to take apart old stereos and radios and put them back together in screwy ways. This was what many people would now term a type of hacking, which in its most general sense means using technology for a purpose that its designers did not originally plan on. But (except for the occasional prank) my purposes in hacking were innocent. Gonzales clearly intended to make a lot of money illegally by collecting tons of computer-record identities and selling them to the highest bidder. In this way he stayed in the background and got the advantages of wholesale crime without having to mess with the retail variety. And clearly he did it for the money, or for what the money could buy.
Now that computer hacking is an ongoing, large-scale criminal activity, the air of playful innocence that used to characterize its aficionados has largely dissipated. Perhaps justly, most organizations and government agencies assume that anyone hacking into their system is doing it to steal, or worse—there are always terrorists, and we have written occasionally about the danger of cyberwars waged by militant hackers.
For those interested in fighting crime, it will always be necessary to learn how the criminals do it in order to fight back. And in the case of hackers, agencies without enough homegrown talent will often look for a turncoat, but the possibility of double-agenthood—exactly what Gonzales did—is always present in such cases.
One of the best ways to keep good hackers from going bad is a thing that is becoming hard to find these days—or at least, I wouldn't know where to start looking for it, unless you could try the U. S. armed forces. What I'm talking about is a deep level of commitment to the good of a nation or organization that becomes the core of one's professional life. But it requires a stable lifetime of commitment on the part of the organization to achieve that, a stability that is increasingly hard to find these days.
One night, years ago, back in Massachusetts, I attended a talk given by a fellow who for years had been a supervisor in the New England Power Pool. This was the organization that coordinated operations of the Northeastern power plants and utilities to make sure everybody's power was reliable, stable, and there when they needed it. Power failures in the dead of winter in New England can be life-threatening, and as I listened to this guy talk, I realized that he was dedication incarnate. He wasn't blustery or table-pounding or anything—but he gave the impression of solid, firm, intelligent commitment to the high calling of keeping New Englanders' lights on, no matter what.
This was back in the days before utility deregulation, when power companies were quasi-governmental entities with more or less guaranteed profits. Perhaps it is just the nostalgic faulty memory of an aging engineer remembering a scene from his younger days, but it does seem to me that the stability engendered by the regulatory environment back then allowed the development of people who could really dedicate their lives to a good cause professionally, without worrying about layoffs and changing careers four or five times in their lifetimes. And, yes, it also allowed for incompetents to featherbed (goof off) for years in companies that didn't care about such things. Was the good worth the bad? I don't know, but I tend to think so.
The computer industry seems never to have been stable enough to produce a cadre of dedicated people whose entire careers could be given over to enforcing computer security for one firm. I'm sure there are such people, but in the nature of the business they've changed jobs several times, especially if they're good, and being dedicated to the good of an industry is a different thing from dedication to a stable group of people in one organization. But my metaphorical hat is off to those guardians of our credit card numbers, whoever they are and whoever they have worked for, who are constantly on the lookout for the activities of people like Albert Gonzales. May their numbers increase—securely.
Sources: Lately the Associated Press, with reasons that are not hard to imagine, has taken to putting sternly-worded copyright notices at the end of their articles, almost no matter where they appear. While they have every right to do so (and since this is a blog on engineering ethics I will attempt to honor their intentions), avoiding any piece of news that happens to appear under an Associated Press byline may get rather dicey at times. At any rate, this blog used material posted on August 18 at ABCNews.com at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=8351894, and background from other sources.
I could dwell on the details of Gonzales's high lifestyle in his native town of Miami, but it is like the high-living stories of most other thieves: spend it while you got it, because you don't know when you'll ever have it again. You wonder if the Secret Service folks paying him for information ever noticed the BMW and the Rolex, but maybe he'd quit dealing with them by the time he was rolling in dough from more profitable employment.
This raises an ethical question that everyone who deals with computer security has to face: when does trying to think like a hacker in order to outwit other hackers cross the line into the gray area when you become a hacker yourself?
The term "hacker" means different things in different contexts. Back in the Middle Ages of electronics, I used to take apart old stereos and radios and put them back together in screwy ways. This was what many people would now term a type of hacking, which in its most general sense means using technology for a purpose that its designers did not originally plan on. But (except for the occasional prank) my purposes in hacking were innocent. Gonzales clearly intended to make a lot of money illegally by collecting tons of computer-record identities and selling them to the highest bidder. In this way he stayed in the background and got the advantages of wholesale crime without having to mess with the retail variety. And clearly he did it for the money, or for what the money could buy.
Now that computer hacking is an ongoing, large-scale criminal activity, the air of playful innocence that used to characterize its aficionados has largely dissipated. Perhaps justly, most organizations and government agencies assume that anyone hacking into their system is doing it to steal, or worse—there are always terrorists, and we have written occasionally about the danger of cyberwars waged by militant hackers.
For those interested in fighting crime, it will always be necessary to learn how the criminals do it in order to fight back. And in the case of hackers, agencies without enough homegrown talent will often look for a turncoat, but the possibility of double-agenthood—exactly what Gonzales did—is always present in such cases.
One of the best ways to keep good hackers from going bad is a thing that is becoming hard to find these days—or at least, I wouldn't know where to start looking for it, unless you could try the U. S. armed forces. What I'm talking about is a deep level of commitment to the good of a nation or organization that becomes the core of one's professional life. But it requires a stable lifetime of commitment on the part of the organization to achieve that, a stability that is increasingly hard to find these days.
One night, years ago, back in Massachusetts, I attended a talk given by a fellow who for years had been a supervisor in the New England Power Pool. This was the organization that coordinated operations of the Northeastern power plants and utilities to make sure everybody's power was reliable, stable, and there when they needed it. Power failures in the dead of winter in New England can be life-threatening, and as I listened to this guy talk, I realized that he was dedication incarnate. He wasn't blustery or table-pounding or anything—but he gave the impression of solid, firm, intelligent commitment to the high calling of keeping New Englanders' lights on, no matter what.
This was back in the days before utility deregulation, when power companies were quasi-governmental entities with more or less guaranteed profits. Perhaps it is just the nostalgic faulty memory of an aging engineer remembering a scene from his younger days, but it does seem to me that the stability engendered by the regulatory environment back then allowed the development of people who could really dedicate their lives to a good cause professionally, without worrying about layoffs and changing careers four or five times in their lifetimes. And, yes, it also allowed for incompetents to featherbed (goof off) for years in companies that didn't care about such things. Was the good worth the bad? I don't know, but I tend to think so.
The computer industry seems never to have been stable enough to produce a cadre of dedicated people whose entire careers could be given over to enforcing computer security for one firm. I'm sure there are such people, but in the nature of the business they've changed jobs several times, especially if they're good, and being dedicated to the good of an industry is a different thing from dedication to a stable group of people in one organization. But my metaphorical hat is off to those guardians of our credit card numbers, whoever they are and whoever they have worked for, who are constantly on the lookout for the activities of people like Albert Gonzales. May their numbers increase—securely.
Sources: Lately the Associated Press, with reasons that are not hard to imagine, has taken to putting sternly-worded copyright notices at the end of their articles, almost no matter where they appear. While they have every right to do so (and since this is a blog on engineering ethics I will attempt to honor their intentions), avoiding any piece of news that happens to appear under an Associated Press byline may get rather dicey at times. At any rate, this blog used material posted on August 18 at ABCNews.com at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=8351894, and background from other sources.
Monday, September 07, 2009
Engineering and Labor: A Road Not Taken
On this Labor Day (as observed in the U. S.), let's consider how engineering has affected the way people work to earn a living, and how the way things have turned out may not necessarily be the best of all possible worlds, at least not for everyone.
Since its inception in the 1800s, modern engineering has assumed the characteristics or goals of the age which gave it birth: "individual achievement, efficiency, progress, faith in science, material comfort, equality, and freedom." This list was taken from a sociological study of families in modern society, but it applies equally well to the goals toward which much of modern engineering strives. Last Saturday I visited a place where these values are not ignored, exactly, but subordinated to a different set of values: "respect for human life, sexual restraint, patriarchy, devotion to family, and love of neighbor." This second list comes from the same source as the first, and despite some negative connotations that some of the terms such as patriarchy have acquired, I think they apply fairly to the place I visited, with some exceptions.
On a few hundred acres of land west of Waco, Texas, a Christian community called Heritage Ministries is trying an ongoing experiment in how to live out the Christian life in a way that puts people, relationships, and family ahead of efficiency, economics, politics, and productivity. That may sound easy, but it's not. The path these folks have chosen is similar to the way the Amish communities in Pennsylvania and elsewhere live, but without many of the rigidities and divisive religious infights that have characterized the Amish. I'm sure the Heritage folks have had their family arguments, but in my very limited exposure to them (a few visits and the reading of one publication), I haven't seen any. Instead, what I see is a way of life that both appeals to me and denies most of what I as an engineer live for.
Let me explain with an example or two. Unlike some Amish communities, the Heritage community welcomes visitors to their retail establishments where they sell samples of what they make: everything from handmade soap to five-thousand-dollar handcrafted rocking chairs. On the day we visited, a team of young men and their sons was squeezing sorghum cane in an old-fashioned mule-powered mill. The juice ran downhill through a pipe to a boiling vat tended by six or eight young ladies and a man who fed the wood fire under the boiler. He told me they had farmed about three acres of cane and expected to make several thousand pints of finished sorghum.
Now I don't know much about sugar cane processing, which is a somewhat different operation, but I'm sure that if you threw a few hundred thousand dollars' worth of capital at this situation, you could easily eliminate all but maybe a tenth of a worker by scaling up the operation to industrial size. A large, modern, efficient sugar processing plant could handle what the little Heritage crew took all day to process in about half a minute. As an engineer, I couldn't stop myself from thinking these ways-to-do-it-better thoughts as I watched the laborious process before me.
It's not that the Heritage people are ignorant, or arbitrarily rejecting every advance in technology made after 1850. They drive cars, use computers, and while I was walking the grounds I nearly tripped over some CAT5 computer cable left over from when they networked their cash registers during one of their semiannual fairs. But their strong belief in " a certain simplicity of lifestyle, a rootedness in the land, [and] an emphasis on family and intentional community" makes them eschew large modern capital investments whenever it tends to separate the worker from the thing worked, and from other workers.
As Heritage leader Blair Adams says in the booklet What We Believe, "a craft, as distinct from a manufacture, can express the inner person for the very reason that he becomes so directly involved in it. And as far as what constitutes 'a waste of time and effort,' money doesn't seem to us the best cirterion for establishing the worth of one's 'time and effort.' To us, meaning and fulfillment provide much better criteria."
In recent years, Heritage and similar communities have benefited from the increased popularity of organically grown foods, the urge to buy local produce, and renewed interest in crafts and other off-the-grid attempts to be less dependent on the global economy. These things are good as far as they go, but a simple analysis shows that they can only go so far. If everybody tried to buy local produce, thus reducing the distance food is shipped, historian James McWilliams has shown that the carbon footprint of food production would actually increase overall because of differences in climate, agricultural technology, and other factors, not to mention the market disruptions it would cause. So for that and many other reasons, it would not be practical for everyone, or even most of the world's urban population, to live the way the Heritage people live. But does that mean it's wrong?
I don't think so. The Heritage community views the way they live as a silent witness to the power of God in Christ Jesus—a way of preaching without words. But regardless of one's beliefs, they show that many of the things we as engineers regard as vitally necessary—labor-saving machinery, cost-effectiveness, and the latest technology—do not play a big role in a whole way of life that, from all outward appearances, is at least as satisfying and enjoyable as our modern, individualistic, grid-dependent one is. And that is a reminder worth bearing in mind.
Sources: The two sociological quotations are from p. 85 of Allan Carlson's From Cottage to Work Station (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), in which he cited the work of sociologist William D'Antonio. The quotations in the paragraph that mentions What We Believe are from the booklet of that title by Blair Adams (Elm Mott, Texas: Colloquium Press Trust, 2005). An article by James McWilliams describing the problems of being a "locavore" can be found in the online edition of Forbes Magazine at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0803/opinions-energy-locavores-on-my-mind.html.
Since its inception in the 1800s, modern engineering has assumed the characteristics or goals of the age which gave it birth: "individual achievement, efficiency, progress, faith in science, material comfort, equality, and freedom." This list was taken from a sociological study of families in modern society, but it applies equally well to the goals toward which much of modern engineering strives. Last Saturday I visited a place where these values are not ignored, exactly, but subordinated to a different set of values: "respect for human life, sexual restraint, patriarchy, devotion to family, and love of neighbor." This second list comes from the same source as the first, and despite some negative connotations that some of the terms such as patriarchy have acquired, I think they apply fairly to the place I visited, with some exceptions.
On a few hundred acres of land west of Waco, Texas, a Christian community called Heritage Ministries is trying an ongoing experiment in how to live out the Christian life in a way that puts people, relationships, and family ahead of efficiency, economics, politics, and productivity. That may sound easy, but it's not. The path these folks have chosen is similar to the way the Amish communities in Pennsylvania and elsewhere live, but without many of the rigidities and divisive religious infights that have characterized the Amish. I'm sure the Heritage folks have had their family arguments, but in my very limited exposure to them (a few visits and the reading of one publication), I haven't seen any. Instead, what I see is a way of life that both appeals to me and denies most of what I as an engineer live for.
Let me explain with an example or two. Unlike some Amish communities, the Heritage community welcomes visitors to their retail establishments where they sell samples of what they make: everything from handmade soap to five-thousand-dollar handcrafted rocking chairs. On the day we visited, a team of young men and their sons was squeezing sorghum cane in an old-fashioned mule-powered mill. The juice ran downhill through a pipe to a boiling vat tended by six or eight young ladies and a man who fed the wood fire under the boiler. He told me they had farmed about three acres of cane and expected to make several thousand pints of finished sorghum.
Now I don't know much about sugar cane processing, which is a somewhat different operation, but I'm sure that if you threw a few hundred thousand dollars' worth of capital at this situation, you could easily eliminate all but maybe a tenth of a worker by scaling up the operation to industrial size. A large, modern, efficient sugar processing plant could handle what the little Heritage crew took all day to process in about half a minute. As an engineer, I couldn't stop myself from thinking these ways-to-do-it-better thoughts as I watched the laborious process before me.
It's not that the Heritage people are ignorant, or arbitrarily rejecting every advance in technology made after 1850. They drive cars, use computers, and while I was walking the grounds I nearly tripped over some CAT5 computer cable left over from when they networked their cash registers during one of their semiannual fairs. But their strong belief in " a certain simplicity of lifestyle, a rootedness in the land, [and] an emphasis on family and intentional community" makes them eschew large modern capital investments whenever it tends to separate the worker from the thing worked, and from other workers.
As Heritage leader Blair Adams says in the booklet What We Believe, "a craft, as distinct from a manufacture, can express the inner person for the very reason that he becomes so directly involved in it. And as far as what constitutes 'a waste of time and effort,' money doesn't seem to us the best cirterion for establishing the worth of one's 'time and effort.' To us, meaning and fulfillment provide much better criteria."
In recent years, Heritage and similar communities have benefited from the increased popularity of organically grown foods, the urge to buy local produce, and renewed interest in crafts and other off-the-grid attempts to be less dependent on the global economy. These things are good as far as they go, but a simple analysis shows that they can only go so far. If everybody tried to buy local produce, thus reducing the distance food is shipped, historian James McWilliams has shown that the carbon footprint of food production would actually increase overall because of differences in climate, agricultural technology, and other factors, not to mention the market disruptions it would cause. So for that and many other reasons, it would not be practical for everyone, or even most of the world's urban population, to live the way the Heritage people live. But does that mean it's wrong?
I don't think so. The Heritage community views the way they live as a silent witness to the power of God in Christ Jesus—a way of preaching without words. But regardless of one's beliefs, they show that many of the things we as engineers regard as vitally necessary—labor-saving machinery, cost-effectiveness, and the latest technology—do not play a big role in a whole way of life that, from all outward appearances, is at least as satisfying and enjoyable as our modern, individualistic, grid-dependent one is. And that is a reminder worth bearing in mind.
Sources: The two sociological quotations are from p. 85 of Allan Carlson's From Cottage to Work Station (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), in which he cited the work of sociologist William D'Antonio. The quotations in the paragraph that mentions What We Believe are from the booklet of that title by Blair Adams (Elm Mott, Texas: Colloquium Press Trust, 2005). An article by James McWilliams describing the problems of being a "locavore" can be found in the online edition of Forbes Magazine at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0803/opinions-energy-locavores-on-my-mind.html.
Monday, August 31, 2009
The Cost of High-Tech Medical Imaging
As federal health-care reform bills make their tortuous way through Congress in September, one aspect of medical care that engineers should pay attention to concerns the cost of procedures that use expensive pieces of equipment such as CT-scan X-ray machines and MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) systems. A recent op-ed piece by a group of medical experts pointed out that one reason we have the most expensive health-care system in the world (by many measures), is that we spend a lot of money on high-tech tests that really don't make people healthier. A study of CT scans in Cedar Rapids, Iowa revealed that in the community of 300,000 people, about 52,000 CT scans were administered in only one year. And that's below the national average, which is even worse. One thing that makes it easy to spend that money is the fact that high-end medical equipment is very expensive, both in terms of initial installation and operating costs. Why is that?
From an engineering point of view, medical imaging combines several factors to make a kind of perfect storm of expense. In the case of a CT-scan machine, you are dealing with X-rays, which require precisely controlled high voltages to generate, and a large array of precision detectors. MRI machines don't use X-rays, but instead they need something even more exotic and hard to generate: precisely controlled magnetic fields of tremendous intensity, which can only be produced with superconducting magnets that use liquid helium. Liquid helium is a costly, exotic material that has to be renewed regularly and needs a whole infrastructure to obtain. So even before you have your data, you've spent a lot of money just generating it. Besides that, a lot of intensive computation is needed to produce the images, but with computer and software costs falling these days, the computational aspect is probably the only part of the system that's cheaper than it used to be. Not just anybody can operate a CT-scan or MRI machine: you require highly trained radiologists or technicians who are familiar with safety requirements and the details of how to acquire good images. These people don't come cheap. Finally, every engineer knows that any piece of equipment's price goes up significantly if it is to be used in medicine. There are special safety and other regulations that medical equipment must meet, and the medical-equipment market is a strange and narrow one compared to, for example, consumer electronics. For all these reasons and more, the typical CT scan device goes for between $150,000 and $300,000, while a whole-body MRI machine will set you back more than a megabuck. And that doesn't count maintenance and operating costs.
Considering all this, it doesn't sound like there's much chance to develop really cheap MRI or CT-scan machines operated by the consumer, which after all would be one way to fix the cost problem. The last consumer-operated X-ray machines were the shoe-store fluoroscopes, now banned because they were dangerous, and rightly so. But suppose Congress succeeds in changing the business model of health care, so that we move away from the present system in which each MRI or CT-scan machine is like a piece of factory equipment whose owners are obliged to operate at full capacity in order to recoup their investment. What if we break the connection between the number of procedures and tests done, and the money taken in, so that it is not so direct as it is today? What consequences might this have for the future of high-tech engineering in health care?
For some reason, I find myself thinking about the computers used by the U. S. Postal Service. That agency does use computers, though it was probably not a national leader in pioneering business applications of computers. My impression is that whoever makes the USPS's computers (I'm talking about the little systems the retail clerks use at local post offices) won that contract a long time ago and has jealously guarded it ever since. Innovation and competition is not a big feature of this deal, I suspect. I have no particular complaints about how the Postal Service uses computers, but they could probably do better.
I pick the Postal Service because their near-monopoly status (at least in terms of small-town facilities nationwide) means their revenue is not that sensitive to the amount of money they spend on innovative technologies. Most of us have seen billboards in big cities advertising the latest and greatest medical testing equipment that thus-and-so hospital system has. Those billboards are there for a reason. You don't see billboards advertising the latest computer system that the Postal Service just bought, because it wouldn't make them any more money.
I'm not saying we should leave the present medical system alone, because it's not perfect, and I agree that we probably waste a lot of money on needless procedures that help pay for too many expensive pieces of medical imaging equipment. But every kind of system has advantages and drawbacks. If health-care providers—private and public—can no longer directly recover capital expenses in a fee-for-service way, they will quit spending so much money on high-tech equipment. Maybe that's a good thing, to a degree. But I wouldn't want to go to the opposite extreme that would remind me of a doctor I once went to who prided himself on how long he could keep his semi-antique EKG machine going. The thing was at least thirty years old, and I had to wait an extra five minutes while the tubes warmed up. I felt like I was participating in a historic re-creation of the invention of electrocardiograms, and it did not impress me favorably.
The trick in this aspect of health-care reform is to negotiate the macro-ethics of finding a happy medium between overuse of expensive technology (which is probably where we are now) and underspending to the point that we fall behind the leading edge of technology, depriving some patients of newer procedures simply because we didn't spend the money on them. A thriving technology sector is a delicate thing, and while cost containment is good, we don't want to reduce spending so much that leading-edge medical imaging companies simply decide to leave the market. That would be a loss not only for us in the United States, but worldwide if such companies lead the global market too.
I'm glad I'm not having to make these decisions, but I hope the congressional staffers working on this decide carefully, and are willing to change course if things don't turn out the way they hoped. Any feedback loop that goes through the Congress and the President has a very long delay time, and so we better hope they get it right the first time, because fixing it might take quite a while.
Sources: The article "10 Steps to Better Health Care," in which the statistic on the Cedar Rapids CT scans appears, is from the online edition of the New York Times at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/13/opinion/13gawande.html.
From an engineering point of view, medical imaging combines several factors to make a kind of perfect storm of expense. In the case of a CT-scan machine, you are dealing with X-rays, which require precisely controlled high voltages to generate, and a large array of precision detectors. MRI machines don't use X-rays, but instead they need something even more exotic and hard to generate: precisely controlled magnetic fields of tremendous intensity, which can only be produced with superconducting magnets that use liquid helium. Liquid helium is a costly, exotic material that has to be renewed regularly and needs a whole infrastructure to obtain. So even before you have your data, you've spent a lot of money just generating it. Besides that, a lot of intensive computation is needed to produce the images, but with computer and software costs falling these days, the computational aspect is probably the only part of the system that's cheaper than it used to be. Not just anybody can operate a CT-scan or MRI machine: you require highly trained radiologists or technicians who are familiar with safety requirements and the details of how to acquire good images. These people don't come cheap. Finally, every engineer knows that any piece of equipment's price goes up significantly if it is to be used in medicine. There are special safety and other regulations that medical equipment must meet, and the medical-equipment market is a strange and narrow one compared to, for example, consumer electronics. For all these reasons and more, the typical CT scan device goes for between $150,000 and $300,000, while a whole-body MRI machine will set you back more than a megabuck. And that doesn't count maintenance and operating costs.
Considering all this, it doesn't sound like there's much chance to develop really cheap MRI or CT-scan machines operated by the consumer, which after all would be one way to fix the cost problem. The last consumer-operated X-ray machines were the shoe-store fluoroscopes, now banned because they were dangerous, and rightly so. But suppose Congress succeeds in changing the business model of health care, so that we move away from the present system in which each MRI or CT-scan machine is like a piece of factory equipment whose owners are obliged to operate at full capacity in order to recoup their investment. What if we break the connection between the number of procedures and tests done, and the money taken in, so that it is not so direct as it is today? What consequences might this have for the future of high-tech engineering in health care?
For some reason, I find myself thinking about the computers used by the U. S. Postal Service. That agency does use computers, though it was probably not a national leader in pioneering business applications of computers. My impression is that whoever makes the USPS's computers (I'm talking about the little systems the retail clerks use at local post offices) won that contract a long time ago and has jealously guarded it ever since. Innovation and competition is not a big feature of this deal, I suspect. I have no particular complaints about how the Postal Service uses computers, but they could probably do better.
I pick the Postal Service because their near-monopoly status (at least in terms of small-town facilities nationwide) means their revenue is not that sensitive to the amount of money they spend on innovative technologies. Most of us have seen billboards in big cities advertising the latest and greatest medical testing equipment that thus-and-so hospital system has. Those billboards are there for a reason. You don't see billboards advertising the latest computer system that the Postal Service just bought, because it wouldn't make them any more money.
I'm not saying we should leave the present medical system alone, because it's not perfect, and I agree that we probably waste a lot of money on needless procedures that help pay for too many expensive pieces of medical imaging equipment. But every kind of system has advantages and drawbacks. If health-care providers—private and public—can no longer directly recover capital expenses in a fee-for-service way, they will quit spending so much money on high-tech equipment. Maybe that's a good thing, to a degree. But I wouldn't want to go to the opposite extreme that would remind me of a doctor I once went to who prided himself on how long he could keep his semi-antique EKG machine going. The thing was at least thirty years old, and I had to wait an extra five minutes while the tubes warmed up. I felt like I was participating in a historic re-creation of the invention of electrocardiograms, and it did not impress me favorably.
The trick in this aspect of health-care reform is to negotiate the macro-ethics of finding a happy medium between overuse of expensive technology (which is probably where we are now) and underspending to the point that we fall behind the leading edge of technology, depriving some patients of newer procedures simply because we didn't spend the money on them. A thriving technology sector is a delicate thing, and while cost containment is good, we don't want to reduce spending so much that leading-edge medical imaging companies simply decide to leave the market. That would be a loss not only for us in the United States, but worldwide if such companies lead the global market too.
I'm glad I'm not having to make these decisions, but I hope the congressional staffers working on this decide carefully, and are willing to change course if things don't turn out the way they hoped. Any feedback loop that goes through the Congress and the President has a very long delay time, and so we better hope they get it right the first time, because fixing it might take quite a while.
Sources: The article "10 Steps to Better Health Care," in which the statistic on the Cedar Rapids CT scans appears, is from the online edition of the New York Times at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/13/opinion/13gawande.html.
Monday, August 24, 2009
Lessons from Russian Hydroelectric Plant Accident
Most of the time, hydroelectric plants are one of the safest ways to generate electricity. The technology has been well established for a century or more, there are few toxic substances or chemicals involved, pollution and other environmental problems are at a minimum, and all in all, hydropower is a pretty benign enterprise. But on Aug. 17, a week ago today, Russia's largest hydropower facility, the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant in Siberia, experienced a massive explosion and flood that at last report killed at least 69 people, knocked out the entire facility, and sent an oil slick down river for miles. What happened?
According to the Wikipedia website on the plant, there have been four major accidents including this one since construction was completed in 1978. The earlier mishaps in 1979, 1985, and 1988 were caused by spring floods that overwhelmed the dam's capacity. This does not give one a positive feeling about the overall balance of the system design. Again according to Wikipedia, the sequence of events last week apparently went like this.
The way a hydroelectric dam works is to direct water under high pressure to turbines. Of course, this means you have a lot of pipes, valves, and regulator mechanisms, and great quantities of water flowing at high speeds and pressures. Somehow a "water hammer" developed in the system. This is basically the same kind of thing you will sometimes hear in domestic plumbing when a toilet or washing-machine valve shuts off suddenly. Moving water has inertia, and when a column of water moving in a confined place suddenly has nowhere to go, the energy stored in the water's motion turns into a sudden pressure surge that makes the pounding noise. In homes, this is usually no more than an annoyance, but at a hydropower facility, the much larger volumes and energies involved can have serious consequences. Well-designed plants have surge absorbers of various kinds installed to prevent this sort of thing, but either the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant didn't have the right kind, they didn't work right, or perhaps an operator error caused a water hammer that exceeded the system's capacity to deal with it.
In any event, a severe water hammer ruptured a conduit leading to a turbine, immediately flooding the engine room and turbine room. This would have been bad enough, but apparently the flood caused a transformer to explode. Transformers used in power plants are filled with oil for insulation and cooling purposes. Ideally this oil is non-flammable, but the high cost of non-flammable oil sometimes means that flammable kinds are used. Whether or not a fire resulted, the explosion wrecked a large area of the turbine hall, apparently breaching outside walls, as some photographs show. As of Sunday, 69 bodies had been recovered from the wreckage, making this the worst hydropower accident in recent memory.
The worst regional consequences of this accident involve the oil slick previously mentioned, and the economic harm to Siberia's aluminum-smelting industry, which used 70% of the power-plant's output. These, while serious, are nothing like the global effects of the Chernobyl disaster, which also involved a power plant in the former Soviet Union. That 1986 accident was caused by operator error at the nuclear facility and emitted tons of highly radioactive material into the air. Nevertheless, I believe more people died in the hydropower incident than died immediately following the Chernobyl accident, so in that sense the hydropower disaster was worse.
Normally, hydroelectric plants do not need large numbers of personnel, especially in areas of the plant that could become hazardous if something went wrong. Small hydroplants can go for days or weeks under totally automatic operation with no personnel present at all, and while a huge facility like the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant would need some operators, it is at least odd that seventy or more people were in harm's way when the explosion occurred. Perhaps this is a legacy of the old Soviet Union days when facilities were often designed to maximize employment rather than efficiency or profit. If that is the case, I hope operators of similar plants realize that even hydroplants are dangerous places, and allowing large numbers of employees to congregate in places that could be flooded if something went wrong, is a bad policy.
If the operation records can be reconstructed, we can eventually discover the cause of the fatal water hammer—whether it was a design flaw, an operator mistake, or a combination. And while I am no hydroelectric-plant designer, floods are fairly easy to model, and if there was some way to keep transformers from exploding in the event of a flood, taking such measures would have at least mitigated the size of last week's accident.
Our sympathies are with those who lost loved ones and friends in the Sayano-Shushenskaya accident. If we can learn that even apparently safe facilities such as hydroelectric plants have their hazards, and prevent such accidents in the future, they will not have died in vain.
Sources: The Wikipedia article referred to is at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sayano–Shushenskaya_hydroelectric_power_station, and is being updated currently as more information emerges. I also referred to news articles on the disaster at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090818/ap_on_re_eu/eu_russia_power_plant and http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_RUSSIA_POWER_PLANT?SITE=MOSTP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT.
According to the Wikipedia website on the plant, there have been four major accidents including this one since construction was completed in 1978. The earlier mishaps in 1979, 1985, and 1988 were caused by spring floods that overwhelmed the dam's capacity. This does not give one a positive feeling about the overall balance of the system design. Again according to Wikipedia, the sequence of events last week apparently went like this.
The way a hydroelectric dam works is to direct water under high pressure to turbines. Of course, this means you have a lot of pipes, valves, and regulator mechanisms, and great quantities of water flowing at high speeds and pressures. Somehow a "water hammer" developed in the system. This is basically the same kind of thing you will sometimes hear in domestic plumbing when a toilet or washing-machine valve shuts off suddenly. Moving water has inertia, and when a column of water moving in a confined place suddenly has nowhere to go, the energy stored in the water's motion turns into a sudden pressure surge that makes the pounding noise. In homes, this is usually no more than an annoyance, but at a hydropower facility, the much larger volumes and energies involved can have serious consequences. Well-designed plants have surge absorbers of various kinds installed to prevent this sort of thing, but either the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant didn't have the right kind, they didn't work right, or perhaps an operator error caused a water hammer that exceeded the system's capacity to deal with it.
In any event, a severe water hammer ruptured a conduit leading to a turbine, immediately flooding the engine room and turbine room. This would have been bad enough, but apparently the flood caused a transformer to explode. Transformers used in power plants are filled with oil for insulation and cooling purposes. Ideally this oil is non-flammable, but the high cost of non-flammable oil sometimes means that flammable kinds are used. Whether or not a fire resulted, the explosion wrecked a large area of the turbine hall, apparently breaching outside walls, as some photographs show. As of Sunday, 69 bodies had been recovered from the wreckage, making this the worst hydropower accident in recent memory.
The worst regional consequences of this accident involve the oil slick previously mentioned, and the economic harm to Siberia's aluminum-smelting industry, which used 70% of the power-plant's output. These, while serious, are nothing like the global effects of the Chernobyl disaster, which also involved a power plant in the former Soviet Union. That 1986 accident was caused by operator error at the nuclear facility and emitted tons of highly radioactive material into the air. Nevertheless, I believe more people died in the hydropower incident than died immediately following the Chernobyl accident, so in that sense the hydropower disaster was worse.
Normally, hydroelectric plants do not need large numbers of personnel, especially in areas of the plant that could become hazardous if something went wrong. Small hydroplants can go for days or weeks under totally automatic operation with no personnel present at all, and while a huge facility like the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant would need some operators, it is at least odd that seventy or more people were in harm's way when the explosion occurred. Perhaps this is a legacy of the old Soviet Union days when facilities were often designed to maximize employment rather than efficiency or profit. If that is the case, I hope operators of similar plants realize that even hydroplants are dangerous places, and allowing large numbers of employees to congregate in places that could be flooded if something went wrong, is a bad policy.
If the operation records can be reconstructed, we can eventually discover the cause of the fatal water hammer—whether it was a design flaw, an operator mistake, or a combination. And while I am no hydroelectric-plant designer, floods are fairly easy to model, and if there was some way to keep transformers from exploding in the event of a flood, taking such measures would have at least mitigated the size of last week's accident.
Our sympathies are with those who lost loved ones and friends in the Sayano-Shushenskaya accident. If we can learn that even apparently safe facilities such as hydroelectric plants have their hazards, and prevent such accidents in the future, they will not have died in vain.
Sources: The Wikipedia article referred to is at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sayano–Shushenskaya_hydroelectric_power_station, and is being updated currently as more information emerges. I also referred to news articles on the disaster at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090818/ap_on_re_eu/eu_russia_power_plant and http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_RUSSIA_POWER_PLANT?SITE=MOSTP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT.
Sunday, August 16, 2009
Carbon Sequestration: Worth the Trouble?
In August of 1986, over 1700 villagers living as far away as 25 km from Cameroon's Lake Nyos died when a mysterious, invisible suffocating cloud enveloped them. They were victims of one of the two known limnic eruptions in recorded history. For years, the waters of Lake Nyos had absorbed carbon dioxide from underground sources, probably volcanic in origin. Because of temperature differences in the lake, the gas-saturated water remained at the bottom until something, possibly as insignificant as high winds, triggered a lake turnover. Once the eruption began, the lake began to boil like a soft-drink bottle you leave out in the sun and open by mistake. A giant cloud of carbon dioxide spilled out of the lake and smothered people and animals for miles around.
This is the same compound that, if numerous carbon sequestration projects now underway are successful, will be buried under tremendous pressure in dozens or hundreds of locations all over the world. The question is: will it stay there?
Ever since humans discovered fire, we have been adding to the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Until the 1800s, the quantity of carbon dioxide humans put into the air was negligible compared to that contributed by natural causes such as forest fires and volcanic activity. The concern with rising levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide, of course, is that it tends to raise the Earth's temperature, other things being equal (which they never are). There is a general scientific consensus that (a) human activity has caused much if not most of the rise in carbon dioxide levels in the past two hundred years and (b) this will cause some increase in the Earth's average temperature, though how much and for how long is a matter of debate. Some theories even posit that a short temperature rise will trigger an instability that will wind us up in another Ice Age a few decades afterwards. Whatever actually happens, the political fact these days is that reducing one's carbon footprint has become a virtue, while emitting carbon, even for a good cause such as bringing the blessings of electric power to poor people, is a sin.
The business world has seen the politicians writing "cap-and-trade" on the wall, and so there is big private money to be made in developing systems that will capture the carbon dioxide generated when fossil fuels (most notably coal) are burned in power plants. A French firm called Alstom is currently building several pilot plants around the country, including one attached to a coal-fired power plant in New Haven, West Virginia.
The technology itself is rather clever. After cooling and washing the flue gas with cold water, they bubble it through a solution of ammonium bicarbonate (contains hydrogen) and ammonium carbonate (no hydrogen). Nearly all the carbon dioxide combines with the ammonium radicals. They pump the fizz-rich liquid under pressure to a heater where the carbon dioxide boils off and is compressed to send it underground. And there, in my opinion, the real trouble begins.
Never mind that the whole pile of machinery is doing something that engineers of an earlier era would have considered ludicrous: capturing the main gaseous combustion product and shooting it underground. The operation adds nothing to the efficiency of the plant, takes a fair amount of energy itself, and creates a long-term hazard compared to which nuclear waste is relatively harmless.
Look at it this way: would you rather live five miles from some well-shielded solid radioactive stuff whose emissions can't even be detected outside the plant boundaries, and which will just sit there and gradually cool off for the next few hundred years; or, would you like to live an equal distance from the wellhead of a giant underground reservoir which, if released, will suddenly spew out and make Lake Nyos look like a minor traffic accident? For my money, I'll take the nuclear stuff any day.
Presumably, geologists have been careful to select locations where the underground carbon dioxide is relatively safe and isolated. Okay, but our experience with large underground gas reservoirs of artificial origin is limited, to say the least. While natural gas has been stored underground for many years (often in depleted gas fields, not coincidentally), the two cases are significantly different. For one thing, natural gas storage is limited to transient market-related storage needs, and so the pressures and volumes required are relatively modest. By contrast, carbon sequestration will be "permanent"—the whole point is to send it down there and make it stay there indefinitely. If it escapes to the atmosphere we are back at Square One after spending billions of dollars for nothing, plus quite likely having numbers of dead citizens on our hands. The pressures and volumes eventually needed for carbon sequestration, if carried out on a large scale, will dwarf the current natural-gas underground storage facilities. While I am unaware of any major accidents that have happened with underground natural gas storage, there may have been some. Of course, carbon dioxide doesn't burn and natural gas does, but suffocation from a non-flammable gas makes you just as dead as if you had burned to death.
What makes a whole lot more sense from a technical point of view is to replace coal-fired power plants with nuclear plants as fast as we can. Nuclear energy generates zero carbon emissions, the nuclear waste problem is manageable even without the ill-fated Yucca Mountain disposal facility that the Obama Administration recently axed, and there are no particular concerns about running out of nuclear fuel any time soon. If we get low we can switch to the kind of reactor that makes more than it consumes.
That is the technical reality. But the political reality right now, which engineers as well as everyone else has to deal with, is that nuclear power is under the same emotion-laden mushroom cloud that has characterized it ever since nuclear weapons ended World War II, and has never freed itself from the almost superstitious fear that the word "nuclear" inspires in many people. Some of that fear has now been transferred to plain old carbon dioxide, a gas which each living human being emits every time we take a breath. When you end up being afraid of yourself, there's no place to hide.
It is still early in the carbon sequestration business, and there is time for the political winds to change before we all get burdened by carbon cap-and-trade taxes to pay for giant sequestration plants that send carbon dioxide into the ground, only to have some of it pop up one day in an unexpected place. Let's hope that cooler heads prevail and we reach a consensus that does sensible things about carbon emissions without burying a lot of unwelcome surprises for our descendants.
Sources: A good article originating at the Washington Post, describing the technology and politics of the carbon sequestration process pioneered by Alstom can be found at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/business/s_638488.html. A description of the geology surrounding the Lake Nyos disaster can be found at http://www.cevl.msu.edu/~long/nyos.htm.
This is the same compound that, if numerous carbon sequestration projects now underway are successful, will be buried under tremendous pressure in dozens or hundreds of locations all over the world. The question is: will it stay there?
Ever since humans discovered fire, we have been adding to the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Until the 1800s, the quantity of carbon dioxide humans put into the air was negligible compared to that contributed by natural causes such as forest fires and volcanic activity. The concern with rising levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide, of course, is that it tends to raise the Earth's temperature, other things being equal (which they never are). There is a general scientific consensus that (a) human activity has caused much if not most of the rise in carbon dioxide levels in the past two hundred years and (b) this will cause some increase in the Earth's average temperature, though how much and for how long is a matter of debate. Some theories even posit that a short temperature rise will trigger an instability that will wind us up in another Ice Age a few decades afterwards. Whatever actually happens, the political fact these days is that reducing one's carbon footprint has become a virtue, while emitting carbon, even for a good cause such as bringing the blessings of electric power to poor people, is a sin.
The business world has seen the politicians writing "cap-and-trade" on the wall, and so there is big private money to be made in developing systems that will capture the carbon dioxide generated when fossil fuels (most notably coal) are burned in power plants. A French firm called Alstom is currently building several pilot plants around the country, including one attached to a coal-fired power plant in New Haven, West Virginia.
The technology itself is rather clever. After cooling and washing the flue gas with cold water, they bubble it through a solution of ammonium bicarbonate (contains hydrogen) and ammonium carbonate (no hydrogen). Nearly all the carbon dioxide combines with the ammonium radicals. They pump the fizz-rich liquid under pressure to a heater where the carbon dioxide boils off and is compressed to send it underground. And there, in my opinion, the real trouble begins.
Never mind that the whole pile of machinery is doing something that engineers of an earlier era would have considered ludicrous: capturing the main gaseous combustion product and shooting it underground. The operation adds nothing to the efficiency of the plant, takes a fair amount of energy itself, and creates a long-term hazard compared to which nuclear waste is relatively harmless.
Look at it this way: would you rather live five miles from some well-shielded solid radioactive stuff whose emissions can't even be detected outside the plant boundaries, and which will just sit there and gradually cool off for the next few hundred years; or, would you like to live an equal distance from the wellhead of a giant underground reservoir which, if released, will suddenly spew out and make Lake Nyos look like a minor traffic accident? For my money, I'll take the nuclear stuff any day.
Presumably, geologists have been careful to select locations where the underground carbon dioxide is relatively safe and isolated. Okay, but our experience with large underground gas reservoirs of artificial origin is limited, to say the least. While natural gas has been stored underground for many years (often in depleted gas fields, not coincidentally), the two cases are significantly different. For one thing, natural gas storage is limited to transient market-related storage needs, and so the pressures and volumes required are relatively modest. By contrast, carbon sequestration will be "permanent"—the whole point is to send it down there and make it stay there indefinitely. If it escapes to the atmosphere we are back at Square One after spending billions of dollars for nothing, plus quite likely having numbers of dead citizens on our hands. The pressures and volumes eventually needed for carbon sequestration, if carried out on a large scale, will dwarf the current natural-gas underground storage facilities. While I am unaware of any major accidents that have happened with underground natural gas storage, there may have been some. Of course, carbon dioxide doesn't burn and natural gas does, but suffocation from a non-flammable gas makes you just as dead as if you had burned to death.
What makes a whole lot more sense from a technical point of view is to replace coal-fired power plants with nuclear plants as fast as we can. Nuclear energy generates zero carbon emissions, the nuclear waste problem is manageable even without the ill-fated Yucca Mountain disposal facility that the Obama Administration recently axed, and there are no particular concerns about running out of nuclear fuel any time soon. If we get low we can switch to the kind of reactor that makes more than it consumes.
That is the technical reality. But the political reality right now, which engineers as well as everyone else has to deal with, is that nuclear power is under the same emotion-laden mushroom cloud that has characterized it ever since nuclear weapons ended World War II, and has never freed itself from the almost superstitious fear that the word "nuclear" inspires in many people. Some of that fear has now been transferred to plain old carbon dioxide, a gas which each living human being emits every time we take a breath. When you end up being afraid of yourself, there's no place to hide.
It is still early in the carbon sequestration business, and there is time for the political winds to change before we all get burdened by carbon cap-and-trade taxes to pay for giant sequestration plants that send carbon dioxide into the ground, only to have some of it pop up one day in an unexpected place. Let's hope that cooler heads prevail and we reach a consensus that does sensible things about carbon emissions without burying a lot of unwelcome surprises for our descendants.
Sources: A good article originating at the Washington Post, describing the technology and politics of the carbon sequestration process pioneered by Alstom can be found at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/business/s_638488.html. A description of the geology surrounding the Lake Nyos disaster can be found at http://www.cevl.msu.edu/~long/nyos.htm.
Monday, August 10, 2009
Twitter and Facebook Silenced by Russo-Georgian Cyberspat
You didn't quite see it here first (as usual, the New York Times seems to be the best source), but just last week we were writing about how cyberwars could cause serious collateral damage. Well, according to the Times, last Thursday millions of users of the social-media sites Twitter and LiveJournal had their service disrupted for the simple reason that a professor in the country of Georgia (formerly part of the old USSR) aroused the ire of some hackers whose malware-spawning abilities were way ahead of their good judgment. The 34-year-old economics professor was posting some nostalgic photos and recollections about the Russia-Georgia conflict of August 2008 when he noticed that the LiveJournal site he was using had gone bad. He tried switching to Facebook, which was also jammed, and then Twitter, which also flaked out for him. It took him a while to learn that he was the main reason that these sites were targeted by a distributed-denial-of-service attack that not only kept him from using them, but disconnected many millions of other users around the world as well. One expert said it was like bombing a TV station because you didn't like one of the newscasters.
Social media have taken on the roles formerly held exclusively by major news outlets with amazing speed. In Iran, during a June 20 election protest a young woman named Neda Agha Soltan was shot and killed. Cell-phone videos of the incident spread around the world to make her the iconic figure of the rebellion, and social media were crucial in this process.
So far, no one is relying on Twitter for much more than entertainment, unless you count a few businesses and advertisers. And so having it disappear for a few hours is nothing compared to finding a terrorist's bomb planted by a railroad line, for example. The argument I hear is that sooner or later, we will have life-critical systems that depend on the Internet in a way that hasn't happened yet, and that's when cyberwars will get serious.
There are several possible ways this situation could go in the future.
One is that engineers who design life-critical systems, keenly aware of the less-than-perfect reliability and security of Internet-based communications, will continue to take precautions that no matter what happens on the Internet, nobody will die as a consequence. That is more or less the case now, at least judging by the absence of fatal outcomes from cyberwars so far.
A second possibility is that cyberattackers will get much more sophisticated and go after hardened systems such as banks and military networks. These are much harder to crack than sites that put a lower priority on security, but determined and disciplined attacks, perhaps using dedicated cyberwar server farms rather than the rather flaky botnets, might cause serious disruptions which would be economically equivalent to blowing up a large number of office buildings (minus the people). Say somebody got hold of a bank's network and messed it up so thoroughly with misinformation and garbage transactions that it would take weeks to straighten it out, and in the meantime no electronic transactions could take place through that bank. This could effectively ruin a financial institution, unless the government stepped in to help, and we're seeing what a mixed bag that can be. And like other terrorist acts, you don't have to shut down the entire system. There is probably a psychological trigger point for bank runs, and the terrorists would only have to reach that point. Mass panic—millions of people lining up at money machines to get cash all at once—would do the rest.
Nobody would get killed, unless maybe in the crush of people around the ATMs, but you would still have an outcome equivalent in economic terms to a physical bombing.
A third scenario is something that I suppose most computer experts believe can't happen: a total freeze-up of the Internet. This might not be as bad as you think. Back when international communications were restricted to submarine cables and radio, every now and then the Earth would be hit by a geomagnetic storm caused by solar flares. Big ones occasionally caused so much surge current in undersea cables as to render them useless, and the ionosphere would get so trashed that long-distance radio channels would go down as well. In really severe storms, domestic telegraph and telephone long-distance lines would see some trouble as well. For a day or two, we'd be back in the early 19th century when the fastest message from London to New York took about a week by sea. The world survived these incidents, nevertheless, and although international commerce was a smaller portion of each nation's economy back then, I think the consequences of a worldwide Internet freeze-up might not be as bad as you might think at first, as long as it didn't last too long.
But if it took more than 24 hours or so to restore service, or if it was a patchwork thing that took weeks to get everyone back to normal, then the consequences would be severe. Just as a lot of the damage from 9/11 was to economic interests in terms of lost airline revenue, depressed retail sales, and so on, the same sort of thing would happen during and after an Internet freeze-up. So it's worthwhile at least thinking about how to prevent such a thing, or how to survive it in case it ever happens.
In the meantime, let's hope that the worst cyberattacks are no worse than last week's Twitter and Facebook scares. Personally, while there are some people I might like to get back in touch with via Facebook, the prospect of hearing unexpectedly from certain others has led me to leave the whole thing alone for the time being, so I didn't miss them. But we'll see how long I can hide.
Sources: The New York Times article on the Georgian cyberattack is at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/technology/internet/08twitter.html?_r=2&hpw.
Social media have taken on the roles formerly held exclusively by major news outlets with amazing speed. In Iran, during a June 20 election protest a young woman named Neda Agha Soltan was shot and killed. Cell-phone videos of the incident spread around the world to make her the iconic figure of the rebellion, and social media were crucial in this process.
So far, no one is relying on Twitter for much more than entertainment, unless you count a few businesses and advertisers. And so having it disappear for a few hours is nothing compared to finding a terrorist's bomb planted by a railroad line, for example. The argument I hear is that sooner or later, we will have life-critical systems that depend on the Internet in a way that hasn't happened yet, and that's when cyberwars will get serious.
There are several possible ways this situation could go in the future.
One is that engineers who design life-critical systems, keenly aware of the less-than-perfect reliability and security of Internet-based communications, will continue to take precautions that no matter what happens on the Internet, nobody will die as a consequence. That is more or less the case now, at least judging by the absence of fatal outcomes from cyberwars so far.
A second possibility is that cyberattackers will get much more sophisticated and go after hardened systems such as banks and military networks. These are much harder to crack than sites that put a lower priority on security, but determined and disciplined attacks, perhaps using dedicated cyberwar server farms rather than the rather flaky botnets, might cause serious disruptions which would be economically equivalent to blowing up a large number of office buildings (minus the people). Say somebody got hold of a bank's network and messed it up so thoroughly with misinformation and garbage transactions that it would take weeks to straighten it out, and in the meantime no electronic transactions could take place through that bank. This could effectively ruin a financial institution, unless the government stepped in to help, and we're seeing what a mixed bag that can be. And like other terrorist acts, you don't have to shut down the entire system. There is probably a psychological trigger point for bank runs, and the terrorists would only have to reach that point. Mass panic—millions of people lining up at money machines to get cash all at once—would do the rest.
Nobody would get killed, unless maybe in the crush of people around the ATMs, but you would still have an outcome equivalent in economic terms to a physical bombing.
A third scenario is something that I suppose most computer experts believe can't happen: a total freeze-up of the Internet. This might not be as bad as you think. Back when international communications were restricted to submarine cables and radio, every now and then the Earth would be hit by a geomagnetic storm caused by solar flares. Big ones occasionally caused so much surge current in undersea cables as to render them useless, and the ionosphere would get so trashed that long-distance radio channels would go down as well. In really severe storms, domestic telegraph and telephone long-distance lines would see some trouble as well. For a day or two, we'd be back in the early 19th century when the fastest message from London to New York took about a week by sea. The world survived these incidents, nevertheless, and although international commerce was a smaller portion of each nation's economy back then, I think the consequences of a worldwide Internet freeze-up might not be as bad as you might think at first, as long as it didn't last too long.
But if it took more than 24 hours or so to restore service, or if it was a patchwork thing that took weeks to get everyone back to normal, then the consequences would be severe. Just as a lot of the damage from 9/11 was to economic interests in terms of lost airline revenue, depressed retail sales, and so on, the same sort of thing would happen during and after an Internet freeze-up. So it's worthwhile at least thinking about how to prevent such a thing, or how to survive it in case it ever happens.
In the meantime, let's hope that the worst cyberattacks are no worse than last week's Twitter and Facebook scares. Personally, while there are some people I might like to get back in touch with via Facebook, the prospect of hearing unexpectedly from certain others has led me to leave the whole thing alone for the time being, so I didn't miss them. But we'll see how long I can hide.
Sources: The New York Times article on the Georgian cyberattack is at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/technology/internet/08twitter.html?_r=2&hpw.
Monday, August 03, 2009
Cyberwars: From Plans to Reality
A report in the New York Times recently revealed that the U. S. military has already engaged to a limited degree in "cyberwar": attacks on an enemy's communications and computer networks. On two separate occasions, attempts were made to disrupt communications networks: one in Serbia in the late 1990s, and another during the early hours of the attack on Iraq in 2003. Both missions were at least partly successful, but both also caused collateral damage in the form of communications disruptions in nations that were not targeted for attack. The same report also described a much more ambitious plan to freeze Iraq's financial system electronically, but the Bush administration vetoed the idea over fears that it might cause a widespread financial panic. As was demonstrated last fall, inaction can just as easily cause widespread financial panic, but that is worlds away from deliberately fouling up a country's banking system. Nevertheless, the fact that we are already in a world where cyberwar is part of the armamentarium may be news to many people, including engineers.
As we mentioned in this space not long ago, the technology of cyberwar has outpaced the legal and moral traditions that govern, or at least address, the conduct of conventional warfare. Clearly, doing something to the Internet that would disrupt services to large numbers of people outside the territory under attack is not a good idea, which is one reason the Bush administration may have restrained themselves from putting Iraq's financial system in the deep freeze. But other issues related to cyberwar are less clear-cut than this.
Consider the principle that military forces should be clearly identifiable (wearing uniforms, etc.). This idea is routinely violated by terrorists, who like to fade into the background of ordinary citizenry, and also by cyberattackers, who are experts at hiding their true identity and whereabouts. I suppose you could leave return addresses in plain text in viruses designed to attack enemy networks, but I somehow doubt anyone is worrying about this.
A more serious consideration is the distinction between civilian and military populations. Until about 1900, it was not considered cricket to target civilian populations in warfare. This rule went by the board in a big way during World War II, when bombers on both sides began carpet-bombing attacks on cities without special regard for limiting their targets to sites of strategic significance. Since then, the principle of no attacks on civilians has received occasional lip service, but that's about all. It's very hard to imagine how a cyberattack could sort out only strategically important computers from those belonging to the average citizen, but maybe as the technology progresses, this sort of thing would be easier to do. The planned but never executed attack on Iraq's financial system would not have discriminated between a paycheck for a general and a payment for a bottle of milk, so clearly we have a ways to go in this regard.
The Obama Administration has said it is going to name a cyberwar czar who will try to centralize activities concerning cybersecurity and related matters. But so far no one has been nominated to the post, and we'll have to wait and see what happens once that person is in place. If history is any guide, this office will languish in obscurity until a major cyberattack causes serious damage to U. S. interests. Then there will be enough political steam generated to get something done, although the horse will have left the barn by then.
Fortunately, defending against cyberattacks is something that we have lots of experience with, since the field of computer science seems to have been born with a native proclivity to spawn hackers of all descriptions who like nothing better than to tear down what other programmers have spent months or years constructing. I don't know why this field is so hacker-prone, but the practical outcome is that we have lots of private-enterprise expertise already that knows how to defend against a variety of attacks, and these experts even work in a coordinated fashion most of the time. Let's hope that whatever the government does will not cripple this advantage, but instead will build upon it and encourage even better cooperation than we have already.
I wish the world was a place where computers and networks were used only for good and productive purposes. But anytime something of value comes into being, somebody is going to get jealous or greedy and want to use it as a pawn in conflicts and wars. The Internet and modern telecommunications systems are a part of our lives now, and so we need to think about how to defend them, and if need be, attack them along with other kinds of infrastructure that is the focus of war. So far, the worst consequences of cyberattacks have been financial losses and inconvenience. Let's hope that with wise planning and forethought, nothing worse will happen to us in this area.
Sources: The New York Times article " Halted ’03 Iraq Plan Illustrates U.S. Fear of Cyberwar Risk" appeared in the Aug. 1, 2009 online edition at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/us/politics/02cyber.html. Full disclosure: as I will mention every now and then, my wife works for About.com, a division of the New York Times Company.
As we mentioned in this space not long ago, the technology of cyberwar has outpaced the legal and moral traditions that govern, or at least address, the conduct of conventional warfare. Clearly, doing something to the Internet that would disrupt services to large numbers of people outside the territory under attack is not a good idea, which is one reason the Bush administration may have restrained themselves from putting Iraq's financial system in the deep freeze. But other issues related to cyberwar are less clear-cut than this.
Consider the principle that military forces should be clearly identifiable (wearing uniforms, etc.). This idea is routinely violated by terrorists, who like to fade into the background of ordinary citizenry, and also by cyberattackers, who are experts at hiding their true identity and whereabouts. I suppose you could leave return addresses in plain text in viruses designed to attack enemy networks, but I somehow doubt anyone is worrying about this.
A more serious consideration is the distinction between civilian and military populations. Until about 1900, it was not considered cricket to target civilian populations in warfare. This rule went by the board in a big way during World War II, when bombers on both sides began carpet-bombing attacks on cities without special regard for limiting their targets to sites of strategic significance. Since then, the principle of no attacks on civilians has received occasional lip service, but that's about all. It's very hard to imagine how a cyberattack could sort out only strategically important computers from those belonging to the average citizen, but maybe as the technology progresses, this sort of thing would be easier to do. The planned but never executed attack on Iraq's financial system would not have discriminated between a paycheck for a general and a payment for a bottle of milk, so clearly we have a ways to go in this regard.
The Obama Administration has said it is going to name a cyberwar czar who will try to centralize activities concerning cybersecurity and related matters. But so far no one has been nominated to the post, and we'll have to wait and see what happens once that person is in place. If history is any guide, this office will languish in obscurity until a major cyberattack causes serious damage to U. S. interests. Then there will be enough political steam generated to get something done, although the horse will have left the barn by then.
Fortunately, defending against cyberattacks is something that we have lots of experience with, since the field of computer science seems to have been born with a native proclivity to spawn hackers of all descriptions who like nothing better than to tear down what other programmers have spent months or years constructing. I don't know why this field is so hacker-prone, but the practical outcome is that we have lots of private-enterprise expertise already that knows how to defend against a variety of attacks, and these experts even work in a coordinated fashion most of the time. Let's hope that whatever the government does will not cripple this advantage, but instead will build upon it and encourage even better cooperation than we have already.
I wish the world was a place where computers and networks were used only for good and productive purposes. But anytime something of value comes into being, somebody is going to get jealous or greedy and want to use it as a pawn in conflicts and wars. The Internet and modern telecommunications systems are a part of our lives now, and so we need to think about how to defend them, and if need be, attack them along with other kinds of infrastructure that is the focus of war. So far, the worst consequences of cyberattacks have been financial losses and inconvenience. Let's hope that with wise planning and forethought, nothing worse will happen to us in this area.
Sources: The New York Times article " Halted ’03 Iraq Plan Illustrates U.S. Fear of Cyberwar Risk" appeared in the Aug. 1, 2009 online edition at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/us/politics/02cyber.html. Full disclosure: as I will mention every now and then, my wife works for About.com, a division of the New York Times Company.
Monday, July 27, 2009
Smashup at an Atom Smasher in Europe
Accidents at high-energy physics labs do not normally make the news. But when the lab is the European Union's crown jewel consortium CERN, and the accident puts their latest and greatest accelerator, the Large Hadron Collider, out of commission for up to a year, the incident is worthy of wider attention than it has gotten so far.
America used to dominate the field of experimental physics, as our first-out-of-the-gate development of nuclear weapons proved. But with the political collapse of the Superconducting Supercollider project, a Texas-based particle accelerator that was cancelled in 1993, the world leadership in high-energy experimental physics began to move to Europe, where last September the Large Hadron Collider was being put through its initial tests.
State-of-the-art particle accelerators are some of the most complex experimental systems ever built. The LHC resides in an underground tunnel 17 miles in circumference under the border between France and Switzerland. The basic idea is to shove atomic nuclei around a huge evacuated pipe with the aid of strong electromagnetic fields and the guidance of monstrous superconducting magnets that have to be submerged in tons of liquid helium. Such enterprises are of course very costly in comparison to more modest laboratory equipment, but a $5 billion expenditure these days when the U. S. Congress is cogitating about health-care programs costing 200 times that much doesn't seem like a lot of money. Nevertheless, you want to protect your investment even if it is only $5 billion, and that seems to be what got damaged the most in last fall's accident.
Superconducting magnets are used because once you get current running in them, no electrical power supply is needed for the magnet itself. To produce the tremendous magnetic fields needed with conventional magnets would require prohibitive amounts of power. But running a superconducting magnet is not a trivial task. The LHC's magnets have to be cooled down to about two degrees C above absolute zero, and only large amounts of liquid helium can do that. So CERN became the world's largest user of helium in its attempt to cool down all the magnets for their inaugural run of the LHC last September.
Nine days after the tests began, an electrical connection between two superconducting magnets apparently failed. In a normal magnet, this would not be that much of a big deal, since an open connection would just cause maybe a transient electrical discharge and then the whole thing would shut down. But with a superconducting magnet, a bad connection causes heat. Heat causes a superconductor to abandon its main desirable property, which is to be superconducting with no resistance. Once some resistance shows up, that generates more heat because the current cannot stop instantaneously in a large magnet. The heat boils off more helium, more of the magnet heats up and gets resistive, and you have a great big vicious circle called a "quench."
Being very large magnets, the LHC units quenched in a big way. The helium pressure was so high it blew all the way into the vacuum tunnel and spread insulation and trash everywhere. Since CERN policy is to clear the tunnel of personnel any time tests like this are going on, no one was injured. But successive press releases in the weeks and months after the accident cited longer and longer delays before the system could be up and running again. As of this writing (July 2009) repairs are still being made, and hopes now are that the LHC can go online again sometime this fall.
While the CERN managers are to be congratulated that this accident didn't hurt or kill anyone, having a multi-billion-dollar machine damage itself to the extent that it takes a year to fix is not exactly wise use of resources either. Any system as complex as the LHC will do unexpected things when first fired up, and CERN has decided to install fault detectors as part of the repair process that will give advance warning of a possible quench condition in the future. This is wise, prudent, and consistent with the highest engineering ethics principles. We just hope it will prevent such accidents in the future.
Which brings us to the larger question: what is all this billions of dollars of machinery and personnel good for? The holy grail of high-energy physics research right now is a thing called the Higgs boson, named after one of the six or seven theoretical physicists who thought of the concept in 1963 and 1964 (somebody had to be first, and it was Peter Higgs). According to the most widely accepted model of subatomic particles, called the Standard Model, the Higgs boson somehow gives mass to all elementary particles (such as electrons, I suppose) that have mass. No one knows how heavy this Higgs boson is, but guesses range from about the weight of a silver atom's nucleus on up. The problem with making really heavy particles like this in a particle accelerator like the LHC is, you need a lot of energy per particle. Current machines can get up to 120 billion electron-volts of energy (120 GeV) into a particle, and the LHC is supposed to reach values about ten times higher. When it finally works. So hopes are high that at long last the elusive Higgs boson will show its face, or tracks, or however they plan to catch one.
Fortunately, nobody has yet had to die for the chance to discover the Higgs boson. But a lot of people have put a lot of effort and money into looking for it, and now after the accident they're having to wait an extra year. Some may look at such work and criticize it on the basis that hey, people are starving in Rwanda and we're spending billions on chasing some pencil-pusher's pipe dream? But the fact that humankind can contemplate the universe and expend lots of energy searching for purely abstract products of the intellect such as the Higgs boson, is one of the things that distinguishes us from animals. I for one wish the CERN workers first safety, then success in their search. But being a Texan, I also wish we'd finished the Supercollider and made Higgs bosons first right here in Waxahachie.
Sources: Several news articles are available on the vicissitudes of the LHC accident. I used material from the U. S. LHC website http://blogs.uslhc.us/?p=393, an article in Discover Magazine online at http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/80beats/2009/02/10/until-next-fall-lhc-smashes-only-hopes-not-particles/, and one at the Big Science News blog at http://bigsciencenews.blogspot.com/2008/09/lhc-quench-stops-cern-re-start-delayed.html. For an instructive news video of what an unplanned superconducting-magnet quench looks like, see the YouTube version of a report on a hospital's MRI magnet that blew up at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1R7KsfosV-o.
America used to dominate the field of experimental physics, as our first-out-of-the-gate development of nuclear weapons proved. But with the political collapse of the Superconducting Supercollider project, a Texas-based particle accelerator that was cancelled in 1993, the world leadership in high-energy experimental physics began to move to Europe, where last September the Large Hadron Collider was being put through its initial tests.
State-of-the-art particle accelerators are some of the most complex experimental systems ever built. The LHC resides in an underground tunnel 17 miles in circumference under the border between France and Switzerland. The basic idea is to shove atomic nuclei around a huge evacuated pipe with the aid of strong electromagnetic fields and the guidance of monstrous superconducting magnets that have to be submerged in tons of liquid helium. Such enterprises are of course very costly in comparison to more modest laboratory equipment, but a $5 billion expenditure these days when the U. S. Congress is cogitating about health-care programs costing 200 times that much doesn't seem like a lot of money. Nevertheless, you want to protect your investment even if it is only $5 billion, and that seems to be what got damaged the most in last fall's accident.
Superconducting magnets are used because once you get current running in them, no electrical power supply is needed for the magnet itself. To produce the tremendous magnetic fields needed with conventional magnets would require prohibitive amounts of power. But running a superconducting magnet is not a trivial task. The LHC's magnets have to be cooled down to about two degrees C above absolute zero, and only large amounts of liquid helium can do that. So CERN became the world's largest user of helium in its attempt to cool down all the magnets for their inaugural run of the LHC last September.
Nine days after the tests began, an electrical connection between two superconducting magnets apparently failed. In a normal magnet, this would not be that much of a big deal, since an open connection would just cause maybe a transient electrical discharge and then the whole thing would shut down. But with a superconducting magnet, a bad connection causes heat. Heat causes a superconductor to abandon its main desirable property, which is to be superconducting with no resistance. Once some resistance shows up, that generates more heat because the current cannot stop instantaneously in a large magnet. The heat boils off more helium, more of the magnet heats up and gets resistive, and you have a great big vicious circle called a "quench."
Being very large magnets, the LHC units quenched in a big way. The helium pressure was so high it blew all the way into the vacuum tunnel and spread insulation and trash everywhere. Since CERN policy is to clear the tunnel of personnel any time tests like this are going on, no one was injured. But successive press releases in the weeks and months after the accident cited longer and longer delays before the system could be up and running again. As of this writing (July 2009) repairs are still being made, and hopes now are that the LHC can go online again sometime this fall.
While the CERN managers are to be congratulated that this accident didn't hurt or kill anyone, having a multi-billion-dollar machine damage itself to the extent that it takes a year to fix is not exactly wise use of resources either. Any system as complex as the LHC will do unexpected things when first fired up, and CERN has decided to install fault detectors as part of the repair process that will give advance warning of a possible quench condition in the future. This is wise, prudent, and consistent with the highest engineering ethics principles. We just hope it will prevent such accidents in the future.
Which brings us to the larger question: what is all this billions of dollars of machinery and personnel good for? The holy grail of high-energy physics research right now is a thing called the Higgs boson, named after one of the six or seven theoretical physicists who thought of the concept in 1963 and 1964 (somebody had to be first, and it was Peter Higgs). According to the most widely accepted model of subatomic particles, called the Standard Model, the Higgs boson somehow gives mass to all elementary particles (such as electrons, I suppose) that have mass. No one knows how heavy this Higgs boson is, but guesses range from about the weight of a silver atom's nucleus on up. The problem with making really heavy particles like this in a particle accelerator like the LHC is, you need a lot of energy per particle. Current machines can get up to 120 billion electron-volts of energy (120 GeV) into a particle, and the LHC is supposed to reach values about ten times higher. When it finally works. So hopes are high that at long last the elusive Higgs boson will show its face, or tracks, or however they plan to catch one.
Fortunately, nobody has yet had to die for the chance to discover the Higgs boson. But a lot of people have put a lot of effort and money into looking for it, and now after the accident they're having to wait an extra year. Some may look at such work and criticize it on the basis that hey, people are starving in Rwanda and we're spending billions on chasing some pencil-pusher's pipe dream? But the fact that humankind can contemplate the universe and expend lots of energy searching for purely abstract products of the intellect such as the Higgs boson, is one of the things that distinguishes us from animals. I for one wish the CERN workers first safety, then success in their search. But being a Texan, I also wish we'd finished the Supercollider and made Higgs bosons first right here in Waxahachie.
Sources: Several news articles are available on the vicissitudes of the LHC accident. I used material from the U. S. LHC website http://blogs.uslhc.us/?p=393, an article in Discover Magazine online at http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/80beats/2009/02/10/until-next-fall-lhc-smashes-only-hopes-not-particles/, and one at the Big Science News blog at http://bigsciencenews.blogspot.com/2008/09/lhc-quench-stops-cern-re-start-delayed.html. For an instructive news video of what an unplanned superconducting-magnet quench looks like, see the YouTube version of a report on a hospital's MRI magnet that blew up at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1R7KsfosV-o.
Monday, July 20, 2009
The Third Pole of the Health-Care Debate
In the current debate over how health care in the U. S. should be funded, no one seems to be talking in a first-principles way about the moral underpinnings of the system. As I've said before, technology and engineering are so heavily involved in modern health care that I think engineers are disingenuous if they say they don't have a dog in this fight.
Sometimes situations can be clarified by going to extremes. I will pick three extremes which I think represent the poles of what we could do about health-care funding, and then see what conclusions we can draw about the moral bases of each.
The first pole is the extreme-libertarian solution: get government totally out of health care and let people figure it out on their own. This would mean shutting down Medicare and Medicaid, selling off all government-run hospitals, and letting the chips (and the patients) fall where they might. I think even the most extreme libertarians might blanch at ending such long-established practices as the licensing of doctors, but maybe not. One of my cousins is a libertarian, and he hasn't blanched in years. Surprisingly, this solution might not make much difference to those who are employed at firms that provide good health benefits. But for retired people who have come to rely on government-paid health care, there would be big problems, as well as for many who can't afford private care or insurance for it. This solution maximizes individual freedom from government actions, but if you're poor or retired or both and can't afford medical care, you would be out of luck. This shows the radical individualism of libertarian philosophy, and why it is inferior as a total guide to life.
The second pole is the extreme-socialist solution as is done in Cuba, for example: free health care for everybody. Of course "free" means the government pays for it all, and Except for the sick folks that documentary filmmaker Michael Moore took along with him to Cuba as an example of how much better their health-care system is than ours, I'm not aware of a huge surge of people who travel to Cuba for their marvelous medical institutions or services. The fact is that any government, especially Cuba's, has finite resources, and when resources are allocated by bureaucrats rather than markets, the results are often less than optimal, even if there are enough resources to begin with, which in the case of Cuba is doubtful. This solution removes a person's economic status from the equation, at least in theory, but requires rationing, waiting lines, and a pretty low average level of quality. Besides which, it seems that government-run health care systems tend to encourage a psychological dependency on the state which some think is mentally unhealthy in the long run. As with most "free" offers, free medical care often comes with political enslavement.
Most debates about the subject seem to be focused on just where between these two poles we ought to land. But I think that leaves out a critical factor, which I will dignify with the designation of my third pole. It's not easy to think of a name for this pole that will not evoke negative connotations. Perhaps "charity" in the older sense of "love" would cover it. Many private and public hospitals provide services to indigent patients whose costs they absorb, which means that everybody else who uses the hospital helps pay for it. Historically, the idea of caring for the sick without consideration of cost was a founding principle of many medical institutions with religious backgrounds. Many hospitals were staffed by nuns who took vows of poverty. And I think when this motivation is present, it forms the best of all foundations for individual careers and institutional principles. Would you rather be treated by a doctor who went into the business because he wanted to help people, or because he could make a pile of money? Yes, skill is part of the equation, but skill is more than mere technical proficiency. Being a quality of character, charity does not fit easily into economic calculations or political structures. But the first two poles either discount it totally or regard it as an unreliable and suspect motivation that is best ignored in favor of government-run solutions to the problem.
Many religious leaders, up to and including Jesus, made healing a vital part of their ministries. I do not have all the answers to our health-care problems, but I think we should consider making more room for and encouraging those who provide care in the neighborhood of the third pole—people and institutions who help patients because it is the right thing to do, not just because they can make money at it or because the government compels them to. If the debate can center more around this idea, I think the outcome, whatever measures it takes from the other two poles, will be better than otherwise.
Sometimes situations can be clarified by going to extremes. I will pick three extremes which I think represent the poles of what we could do about health-care funding, and then see what conclusions we can draw about the moral bases of each.
The first pole is the extreme-libertarian solution: get government totally out of health care and let people figure it out on their own. This would mean shutting down Medicare and Medicaid, selling off all government-run hospitals, and letting the chips (and the patients) fall where they might. I think even the most extreme libertarians might blanch at ending such long-established practices as the licensing of doctors, but maybe not. One of my cousins is a libertarian, and he hasn't blanched in years. Surprisingly, this solution might not make much difference to those who are employed at firms that provide good health benefits. But for retired people who have come to rely on government-paid health care, there would be big problems, as well as for many who can't afford private care or insurance for it. This solution maximizes individual freedom from government actions, but if you're poor or retired or both and can't afford medical care, you would be out of luck. This shows the radical individualism of libertarian philosophy, and why it is inferior as a total guide to life.
The second pole is the extreme-socialist solution as is done in Cuba, for example: free health care for everybody. Of course "free" means the government pays for it all, and Except for the sick folks that documentary filmmaker Michael Moore took along with him to Cuba as an example of how much better their health-care system is than ours, I'm not aware of a huge surge of people who travel to Cuba for their marvelous medical institutions or services. The fact is that any government, especially Cuba's, has finite resources, and when resources are allocated by bureaucrats rather than markets, the results are often less than optimal, even if there are enough resources to begin with, which in the case of Cuba is doubtful. This solution removes a person's economic status from the equation, at least in theory, but requires rationing, waiting lines, and a pretty low average level of quality. Besides which, it seems that government-run health care systems tend to encourage a psychological dependency on the state which some think is mentally unhealthy in the long run. As with most "free" offers, free medical care often comes with political enslavement.
Most debates about the subject seem to be focused on just where between these two poles we ought to land. But I think that leaves out a critical factor, which I will dignify with the designation of my third pole. It's not easy to think of a name for this pole that will not evoke negative connotations. Perhaps "charity" in the older sense of "love" would cover it. Many private and public hospitals provide services to indigent patients whose costs they absorb, which means that everybody else who uses the hospital helps pay for it. Historically, the idea of caring for the sick without consideration of cost was a founding principle of many medical institutions with religious backgrounds. Many hospitals were staffed by nuns who took vows of poverty. And I think when this motivation is present, it forms the best of all foundations for individual careers and institutional principles. Would you rather be treated by a doctor who went into the business because he wanted to help people, or because he could make a pile of money? Yes, skill is part of the equation, but skill is more than mere technical proficiency. Being a quality of character, charity does not fit easily into economic calculations or political structures. But the first two poles either discount it totally or regard it as an unreliable and suspect motivation that is best ignored in favor of government-run solutions to the problem.
Many religious leaders, up to and including Jesus, made healing a vital part of their ministries. I do not have all the answers to our health-care problems, but I think we should consider making more room for and encouraging those who provide care in the neighborhood of the third pole—people and institutions who help patients because it is the right thing to do, not just because they can make money at it or because the government compels them to. If the debate can center more around this idea, I think the outcome, whatever measures it takes from the other two poles, will be better than otherwise.
Monday, July 13, 2009
Cyber-Security and North Korea: Worth Worrying About?
Beginning on July 4, numerous government and private websites in both South Korea and the U. S. succumbed temporarily to attacks by a shadowy entity suspected of connections with North Korea. Although the damage and disruption were temporary, this sort of thing may be a small wave of a big future for web-based warfare. But unlike conventional warfare, which has at least the restrictions of the Geneva Convention, cyber-warfare is so new that there are few international agreements about it, and even less agreement among those responsible in the U. S. as to what should be done to defend against it.
First, the attacks. According to the Wall Street Journal, they were "relatively unsophisticated," but that doesn't mean they weren't effective. The distributed denial-of-service attacks were carried out by large numbers of computers which harbored a virus that ordered them to flood the targeted websites with requests for service. It takes time for website operators to notice what's going on, get a fix on where it's coming from, computationally speaking, and devise work-arounds to restore service to legitimate users. In the case of these attacks, the time involved was as long as three to four days during which service was interrupted or degraded to some degree. Besides several government-operated websites in North Korea, U. S. websites operated by the Defense Department, the Federal Aviation Administration, and private entities such as the New York Stock Exchange and Amazon.com were attacked.
Although positive identification in these types of attacks is difficult, the timing and other characteristics of the attacks makes it likely that North Korea is responsible. North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il is in poor health and has not made public his plans for a transfer of power. That makes the normally volatile country even more unstable and likely to pull malicious pranks such as nuclear-weapons tests and missile firings, which have also occurred in recent months. But when should we quit calling these web attacks pranks and take them more seriously?
Cyber-warfare is the ultimate in modern conflicts. It resembles conventional terrorist actions such as suicide bombings in that its effects are large in proportion to the resources required, its perpetrators wear no uniforms and can blend into the civilian populace easily, and identifying even so broad a category as the country of origin for a cyber-attack is difficult, let alone finding the people responsible. As far as I know, no one has died as a direct consequence of a cyber-attack, although as more and more life-critical systems from medical care to power grids depend on the Internet, this may soon change. Websites accessible to the general public are the easiest targets, but the harm caused by disabling them is generally limited to loss of revenue or public access, which is inconvenient but not life-threatening.
We can expect that attackers will grow in sophistication and focus as time goes on. There is already some concern that critical infrastructure systems that use the Internet are more vulnerable to attack than they should be. But if history is any guide, we will coast along in blissful ignorance until someone wreaks real harm—death or destruction of large amounts of real property—before steps are taken to remedy these vulnerabilities.
Conventional wars were fought over physical objectives such as territory, natural resources, or lives. As much as many terrorists would like to, no one has yet figured out a way to kill you by means of your own computer, unless you count grabbing your laptop and lamming you over the head with it. There is a cautionary lesson here for those who would like to integrate their own bodies with the web by direct implants of nerve-stimulating devices in the brain and so on. If a computer does something I don't like, I can always walk away. But if it's wired permanently to my brain and some hacker gets his hands on it, I won't have that option. There's a sci-fi movie for you, but one I wouldn't want to watch.
President Obama, to his credit, appears to be the most web-savvy occupant of the White House so far. But his plans to name a cyber-czar in charge of government internet security have hung in limbo as he searches for a suitable candidate. It's not like the President has nothing else to do, but this may be one of those cases where we will wish he'd paid a little more attention to a low-profile matter at the expense of one more town-hall meeting on health care, for example.
All the same, I hope that such a czar will wear his or her authority lightly. One of the strengths of the Internet, and the cyberworld as a whole, is the way that highly distributed expertise works very effectively most of the time to remedy problems as they occur. It is an example of engineering ethics at work that is quiet, not flashy, but worthy of our attention nonetheless. The great majority of computer and networking experts have a vision of the way things ought to be that is both moral and efficient, and tend to work most of the time in cooperation with each other to keep things running well. But the strength of such distributed expertise is also its weakness, in that it takes only a few malicious people who grab the controls to mess things up. Let's hope that we can mount organized defenses against such attacks in time to thwart them before they cause the kind of headlines that 9/11 received.
Sources: I used information from the following articles on the recent cyber-attacks: a piece by Donald Kirk of the Christian Science Monitor at http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0708/p06s24-woap.html, and an article in the online edition of the Wall Street Journal by Siobhan Gorman and Evan Ramstad at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124701806176209691.html.
First, the attacks. According to the Wall Street Journal, they were "relatively unsophisticated," but that doesn't mean they weren't effective. The distributed denial-of-service attacks were carried out by large numbers of computers which harbored a virus that ordered them to flood the targeted websites with requests for service. It takes time for website operators to notice what's going on, get a fix on where it's coming from, computationally speaking, and devise work-arounds to restore service to legitimate users. In the case of these attacks, the time involved was as long as three to four days during which service was interrupted or degraded to some degree. Besides several government-operated websites in North Korea, U. S. websites operated by the Defense Department, the Federal Aviation Administration, and private entities such as the New York Stock Exchange and Amazon.com were attacked.
Although positive identification in these types of attacks is difficult, the timing and other characteristics of the attacks makes it likely that North Korea is responsible. North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il is in poor health and has not made public his plans for a transfer of power. That makes the normally volatile country even more unstable and likely to pull malicious pranks such as nuclear-weapons tests and missile firings, which have also occurred in recent months. But when should we quit calling these web attacks pranks and take them more seriously?
Cyber-warfare is the ultimate in modern conflicts. It resembles conventional terrorist actions such as suicide bombings in that its effects are large in proportion to the resources required, its perpetrators wear no uniforms and can blend into the civilian populace easily, and identifying even so broad a category as the country of origin for a cyber-attack is difficult, let alone finding the people responsible. As far as I know, no one has died as a direct consequence of a cyber-attack, although as more and more life-critical systems from medical care to power grids depend on the Internet, this may soon change. Websites accessible to the general public are the easiest targets, but the harm caused by disabling them is generally limited to loss of revenue or public access, which is inconvenient but not life-threatening.
We can expect that attackers will grow in sophistication and focus as time goes on. There is already some concern that critical infrastructure systems that use the Internet are more vulnerable to attack than they should be. But if history is any guide, we will coast along in blissful ignorance until someone wreaks real harm—death or destruction of large amounts of real property—before steps are taken to remedy these vulnerabilities.
Conventional wars were fought over physical objectives such as territory, natural resources, or lives. As much as many terrorists would like to, no one has yet figured out a way to kill you by means of your own computer, unless you count grabbing your laptop and lamming you over the head with it. There is a cautionary lesson here for those who would like to integrate their own bodies with the web by direct implants of nerve-stimulating devices in the brain and so on. If a computer does something I don't like, I can always walk away. But if it's wired permanently to my brain and some hacker gets his hands on it, I won't have that option. There's a sci-fi movie for you, but one I wouldn't want to watch.
President Obama, to his credit, appears to be the most web-savvy occupant of the White House so far. But his plans to name a cyber-czar in charge of government internet security have hung in limbo as he searches for a suitable candidate. It's not like the President has nothing else to do, but this may be one of those cases where we will wish he'd paid a little more attention to a low-profile matter at the expense of one more town-hall meeting on health care, for example.
All the same, I hope that such a czar will wear his or her authority lightly. One of the strengths of the Internet, and the cyberworld as a whole, is the way that highly distributed expertise works very effectively most of the time to remedy problems as they occur. It is an example of engineering ethics at work that is quiet, not flashy, but worthy of our attention nonetheless. The great majority of computer and networking experts have a vision of the way things ought to be that is both moral and efficient, and tend to work most of the time in cooperation with each other to keep things running well. But the strength of such distributed expertise is also its weakness, in that it takes only a few malicious people who grab the controls to mess things up. Let's hope that we can mount organized defenses against such attacks in time to thwart them before they cause the kind of headlines that 9/11 received.
Sources: I used information from the following articles on the recent cyber-attacks: a piece by Donald Kirk of the Christian Science Monitor at http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0708/p06s24-woap.html, and an article in the online edition of the Wall Street Journal by Siobhan Gorman and Evan Ramstad at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124701806176209691.html.
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